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The century and a half story of American corporate reorganization law
exhibits a distinctive pattern: a long, slow wave, drifting between flexibility
and fairness, and back again.1 Flexibility in the corporate bankruptcy process
means that it can adapt to changing times and changing corporate structures.
Fairness means that the process fully respects the privileges of all
stakeholders, without preferences for insiders or repeat players in a process
that turns on key questions of who should get paid when there are limited
resources.
The two coexist uneasily in corporate bankruptcy: flexibility is
enhanced by reducing the number of voices that matter in a corporate
restructuring. But reducing voice rather obviously reduces fairness.
Flexibility is also a tool that favors large, repeat players, who can learn to
use flexibility. Along the way, there is also a temptation to utilize that
knowledge in understandably self-interested ways that maximize repeat
player recoveries at the expense of the less sophisticated. Indeed, it can be
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said that repeat players will seek out flexibility precisely because it is less
fair. On some level, flexibility and fairness will always represent inherent
tradeoffs in this context.
That said, and as I develop throughout the paper, there is real risk that
fairness considerations are used mostly by other repeat players who have lost
in the earlier flexibility competition. Specifically, the small player gets held
up as a posterchild for more fairness, when in practice many of the reforms
end up being used to the benefit of larger or repeat players.
Restructuring law developed in flexibility, only to have that taken away,
first slowly by courts and then abruptly by New Dealers determined to
improve corporate reorganization’s fairness. Then flexibility returned,
somewhat gradually, with the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.2
After more than four decades under the Code, that flexibility has been
expanded to the point where, at least in big chapter 11 cases, it seems that a
reorganization can take any form. Whatever key constituencies agree to ex
ante can now be packaged in a “Restructuring Support Agreement” and
made binding by the court.3
Flexibility now reigns supreme. The Code is situated in the extreme;
the forces of fairness are primed for a counterattack. Any move to an
extreme pole in this regard is inherently incompatible with the opposite; thus,
extreme flexibility also means increased deviations from fairness, which
makes such a backlash almost inevitable.
***
Almost seventy years ago, Walter Blum observed that while corporate
finance documents are drafted as if they will be enforced in state court, at a
sheriff’s sale, the reality has long been that large corporations are never
liquidated, but instead reorganized.4 One key motivation behind this
inclination to reorganize, “is that the assets of a distressed business are not
to be disposed of until there has been a reasonable opportunity to determine
what disposition will be most advantageous. This principle is so clearly

2. See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525 (1984) (noting “the policies
of flexibility and equity built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code”).
3. See David A. Skeel, The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV.
699, 701 (2017) (“[I]f we look at current bankruptcy practice, creditor equality seems to be
rapidly disappearing. Bankruptcy courts often bless arrangements that give one group of
general creditors starkly different treatment than other groups.”).
4. See Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI.
L. REV. 565, 566 (1950) (discussing corporate reorganization under the national Bankruptcy
Act).
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sound that elaboration is unnecessary.”5
American corporate insolvency law developed hand-in-hand with
corporations. From the days before the Civil War, to recent times, the everincreasing sophistication of corporate operations and capital structures have
called for corresponding changes in the techniques for addressing financial
distress. Until Congress could be persuaded to use its powers under the
Bankruptcy Clause to address corporations, development of these techniques
often involved reshaping existing non-bankruptcy tools to meet new
challenges.6 This was the story throughout the Nineteenth and early
Twentieth Centuries.
Thus, in the very early days before the Civil War and immediately after,
large corporations – mostly railroads – were reorganized within the context
of a mortgage foreclosure sale. When the foreclosure process was found
wanting, receiverships were adapted as a reorganization tool.7 In both cases,
the reorganization techniques became increasingly flexible, so that by the
turn of the twentieth century, large American corporations could restructure
their multi-million-dollar capital structures with relative ease.8
But soon thereafter, the pushback began. Cries of “collusion” and
claims that the court system was being used to reward insiders and cut off
small investors soon lead courts to impose increasingly stringent limitations
on reorganizations done through equity receiverships. At the same time,
these new rules were used by sophisticated holdout creditors to extract more
value for their claims.9 The receiverships perhaps became “fairer” as a result
of the newly imposed rules, but they also were becoming less useful.
Proponents of the receiverships thought they had saved them when the
process was codified in the early 1930s as sections 77 and 77B of the 1898
federal Bankruptcy Act. The codification did away with the need for an
5. Id.
6. See Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171,
190-92 (1936) (explaining how the movement towards large scale industries helped change
America’s doctrines of equity).
7. See, e.g., Joseph C. Simpson, Comments on the Railroad Reorganization Provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 30 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209 (1975) (“This procedure, developed
largely through ingenuity in federal court practice, in effect converted old equity forms
originally intended to transform the debtor’s property into cash for distribution among
creditors into a procedure which achieved the opposite result, namely, preserving the
properties intact while adjusting the debts.”).
8. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd’s Legacy and Blackstone’s
Ghost, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 393, 405 (1999).
9. For a general discussion of the holdup problem, see JOHN EVARTS TRACY,
CORPORATE FORECLOSURES, RECEIVERSHIPS, AND REORGANIZATIONS § 299 (1929). See also
ADRIAN H. JOLINE, METHOD AND CONDUCT OF THE REORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS 85–
86 (1910).
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inefficient ancillary receivership system,10 and section 77 even did away with
the need for receivers, pioneering the “debtor in possession” system that we
use today.11
Both sections made clear that holdouts could be bound to a
reorganization plan supported by a majority.12 Moreover, sections 77 and
77B overcame the steady narrowing of the equity receivership architecture
by the Supreme Court.13
But soon thereafter, railroad receiverships were taken over by the
Interstate Commerce Commission in a completely revamped version of
section 77, and the Chandler Act replaced section 77B – the general
corporate reorganization provision – with chapter X.14 Under that new
chapter, the reorganization of large companies would be overseen by not
only bankruptcy courts, but also the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which was specially entrusted to look after the interests of small investors.15
Insiders were kept far away from the process, and corporate
management replaced with a court-appointed trustee. 16
10. For a discussion of these costs, see infra note 118 and text.
11. 8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES 104 (1940). See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107 (the debtor in possession
provisions of the current Code).
12. 8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES 83–84 (1940).
13. Discussed infra notes 107 to 116 and text.
14. Congress codified the railroad receivership process in 1933 – Act of March 3, 1933,
chap. 204, 47 Stat. 1474 (1933) (“section 77”) – and the receiverships of other, non-rail
corporations in 1934. Act of June 7, 1934, chap. 424, 48 Stat. 211 (1934) (“section 77B”).
Leslie Craven & Warner Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1254, 1258–60 (1936). In 1938, the Chandler Act (52 Stat. 840) was adopted.
Section 77, relating to railroads, was retained, and Chapter X, Corporate Reorganizations,
replaced former section 77B. William O. Douglas, Improvement in Federal Procedure for
Corporate Reorganizations, 24 A.B.A. J. 875 (1938). Section 77 essentially put an end to
railroad receiverships. Note, Bankruptcy - Railroad Reorganization - Reorganization Under
Consent Receivership Held Improper Where Statutory Reorganization Provisions Are
Applicable, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1116 (1944) (“Since the enactment of § 77 . . . the railroads and
their creditors have practically abandoned the use of equity receiverships in favor of the
statutory system. . . .”).
15. Frederick J. R. Heebe, Corporate Reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, 16 LOY. L. REV. 27, 28 (1969).
16. See Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past
As Prologue?, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 839, 872 (2013) (“The New Deal reforms essentially
closed out the era of large corporate reorganizations . . . In particular, the Wall Street
reorganization lawyers who had been at the center of the practice exited it. The imposition of
an independent trustee meant that managers who sought to reorganize would lose control over
a firm and, perhaps, their jobs as well.”) (footnotes omitted).
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The process was exceedingly fair, but rarely used.17 Indeed, whenever
possible, debtor-firms attempted to use chapter XI, which had been designed
for small businesses.18 Somewhat ironically, an era founded on extreme
fairness was increasingly utilizing covert flexibility.
With the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the law we still use today, chapter 11
was revised to allow corporate reorganization of all sorts to proceed under
an openly flexible scheme.19 At first, the process was dominated by debtors
and their management, but by the 1990s, creditors learned how to play too.20
Soon a statute drafted to deal with 1970s businesses was doing a good job
reorganizing tech companies and capital structures far more complex than
any the drafters could have imagined.21
But recently, worries have resurfaced about the fairness of the process.
Cases are increasingly filed in jurisdictions far away from the bulk of
creditors and employees, and shareholders are increasingly viewed as more
of a nuisance than a legitimate stakeholder in the process. Insiders (including
controlling creditors) structure deals before cases are filed, and courts have
shown a willingness to adopt these deals within the chapter 11 process,
despite concerns that the deals might not strictly comply with the Code.
And thus, we see the early signs of backlash.
In its recent opinion in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation,22 the
Supreme Court rejected the idea that a “structured settlement” could be used
to end a chapter 11 case on a broadly consensual basis, when doing so would
avoid the holdup power granted to a narrow group of objecting creditors.
While the Third Circuit had suggested a “rare case” exception that could be
17. See Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and
Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920, 940 (1964) (“Over the years, Chapter X has more
and more faded into the background. . . .”).
18. Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate
Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 659 (1974).
19. See In re AG Consultants Grain Div., Inc., 77 B.R. 665, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987)
(“The idea behind Chapter 11 of the Code was to combine the speed and flexibility of Chapter
XI with some of the protection and remedial tools of Chapter X.”). See also Michelle M.
Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 469, 484 (2011); William C. Whitford, What’s Right About Chapter 11, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1399 (1994).
20. Although academics perhaps overstated the lessons that could be learned from the
specific market conditions present in the late 1990s and early 2000s. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai
& Stephen J. Lubben, Involuntary Creditors and Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 U. BRIT.
COLUMBIA L. REV. 253, 265–66 (2012).
21. See generally Hon. Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11-Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 167, 183 (1996) (noting that “the extraordinary flexibility of chapter 11 has
proven itself in handling a wide panoply of business enterprises—and business problems”).
22. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 1, 3 (2017) (analyzing the legality
of a distribution scheme employed by a company filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy).

2020]

FAIRNESS AND FLEXIBILITY

137

applied sparingly for sufficient reasons, the Supreme Court baulked, noting
that “it is difficult to give precise content to the concept ‘sufficient reasons.’
That fact threatens to turn a ‘rare case’ exception into a more general rule.”
Instead, the Court held that the absolute priority rule “has long been
considered fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code’s operation,” and that the
“priority system constitutes a basic underpinning of business bankruptcy
law.” In short, follow the rules.
Other cases have rejected the “gifting” of senior creditor recoveries to
junior players23 or the use of the old “doctrine of necessity” to pay important
trade creditors in full during a chapter 11 case. 24 The flexibility of modern
chapter 11 risks being slowly rolled back.25
In many respects, chapter 11 today is much like corporate
reorganization in the early 1930s, when after a brief “wobble” in the 1920s,
due to some unhelpful Supreme Court decisions, it looked like the basic
reorganization structure had stabilized around sections 77 and 77B. The
modern widespread use of aggressive restructuring support agreements that
set forth deals with only an incidental connection to the actual structure of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code looks much like the very same smugness that
pervaded section 77 and 77B cases right up until the New Dealers announced
“enough.”26
Are we fated to travel back to the other extreme, “reforming” chapter
11 so much that it ceases to be useful?
The key insight of this paper is that neither extreme fairness nor extreme
flexibility are stable states for our system of corporate reorganization,
because moves to extreme fairness tend to render reorganization systems
unusable, and the need for a functional reorganization system will inherently
force a move back from fairness and toward flexibility. Moreover, claims of
“fairness” are too easily coopted by repeat players seeking an edge on their
rivals. But extreme flexibility is also unstable, in that it invites the kind of

23. See generally In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 98 (2d Cir. 2011) (ruling on the
legality of DBSD North America’s restructuring plan).
24. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a bankruptcy
court may issue any order necessary to ensure that the parties comply with all provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code).
25. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 508 B.R. 283, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“Although flexibility is necessary . . . the federal scheme cannot remain comprehensive if
interested parties and bankruptcy courts in each case are free to tweak the law to fit their
preferences. . . .”) (citation omitted).
26. See generally Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism:
Principles for Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 169 (2018) (analyzing the use of restructuring support agreements in corporate control
transactions within the bankruptcy context).
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backlash this introduction has outlined.
Deeper understanding is needed before true (and lasting) reform can be
achieved.
***
This paper begins by tracing the history of the cycle of American
corporate bankruptcy law between fairness and flexibility.27 Part 1 recounts
the early journey from mortgage foreclosures to equity receiverships, a story
that largely turns on the growth of railroads as multi-state businesses. Here,
we see the growing flexibility of corporate reorganization procedures, as
they use old forms in new and creative ways.
Part 2 picks up the story in the New Deal and carries it up to the Jimmy
Carter years. Here we see the move back toward fairness, but with a
corporate reorganization process that was of declining utility, particularly for
larger businesses. In many respects it is remarkable that the nation persisted
as long as it did – about forty years – with such a deficient reorganization
system.
Part 3 then looks at the adoption of the current Bankruptcy Code in
1978. The story becomes a move once again toward flexibility, as the several
reorganization provisions of the old Bankruptcy Act were folded into a single
reorganization chapter: today’s chapter 11.28 Prepacks, 363 sales, first day
motions, and then restructuring support agreements have all molded chapter
11 into a tool that could support nearly any form of corporate reorganization.
Part 4 then examines the growing move to reign in the flexibility of
chapter 11. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Jevic, the backlash against the
2009 automotive chapter 11 cases, the widespread disdain for permitting
bankruptcy judges to exercise discretion,29 and the preference for fixed rules,
all point toward a new move toward fairness.

27. Cf. Mark J. Roe, Three Ages of Bankruptcy, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 187 (2017) (telling
a substantially different story of bankruptcy law’s cycles that relies on underlying market
conditions as a “major explanation” for the changes in bankruptcy law).
28. Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 1712–
1713 (1996).
29. Reflected in the business context in things like section 560, which prohibits any sort
of injunction in connection with a swap (derivative), even when the alleged “swap” might be
little more than an ordinary supply contract. See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) (defining “swap
agreement” to include most every sort of derivative, including “any agreement or transaction
that is similar to any other agreement or transaction referred to in this paragraph and that . . .
is a . . . swap.”). See Stephen J. Lubben, Subsidizing Liquidity or Subsidizing Markets? Safe
Harbors, Derivatives, and Finance, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 463, 471–72 (2017) (providing an
overview of the derivative safe harbors in the Code, including section 560).
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In Part 5, I then argue caution in making this move, not so much because
I believe that concerns expressed about current chapter 11 practice are
misguided, so much as I fear the proffered remedies are worse than the
underlying problem. In short, I fear that in remedying the problems with
chapter 11 in its current guise, we are enabling a new era where the holdout
creditor will reign supreme. Moreover, many attempts to set fixed, inflexible
rules into the corporate reorganization process simply reflect one group’s
triumph over another. And in a fight among large, sophisticated investors –
hedge fund A vs. distressed debt fund B – I see no reason to take sides.
Thus, I conclude by arguing that changes to help the legitimate interests
of small players getting crushed in the current system are worthwhile, but
“reforms” that ultimately help distressed debt investors or other asset
managers extract greater returns from bankrupt corporations are misguided
at best. Moreover, as shown by an analysis of the prior reign of tremendous
fairness – from about 1938 to 1978 – such a system is inherently unstable
because the corporate reorganization system becomes unworkable. Rigidity
increases the pressure for change and the likelihood of stealth evasion. The
best solution then is to scale back the extremes of the present ultra-flexible
chapter system, without going so far as to thwart its very utility.
Indeed, only by appreciating the inherent contradiction between
political discourse that emphasizes the small player, on the one hand, and the
actual practice of so many restructuring law reforms (which tend to benefit
big players) will we understand why attempts to bring fairness to corporate
bankruptcy have so often proven unstable.
1.

THE EARLY YEARS: DEVELOPING FLEXIBILITY

Until the Bankruptcy Act was signed into law by President McKinley
on July 1, 1898, federal bankruptcy law consisted of three laws, each of
limited duration.30 Moreover, even the 1898 Act excluded railroads, which
had long been seen as vital public utilities that could not be permitted to
liquidate in bankruptcy or otherwise.31 As one latter commentator noted,
30. This history is discussed in finer detail in Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding
of the Bankruptcy Clause, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 319 (2013). See also 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1108 (1833) (“It is well
known, that the power has lain dormant, except for a short period, ever since the constitution
was adopted; and the excellent system, then put into operation, was repealed, before it had
any fair trial, upon grounds generally believed to be wholly beside its merits, and from causes
more easily understood, than deliberately vindicated.”).
31. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 135 (1881). My focus is on large corporations
generally, but until the late 19th century, we can largely assume that all large corporations
were railroads.
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railroads developed the earliest forms of corporate reorganization, because
To an even greater extent than in the case of private corporations,
the solution to the financial difficulties of a railroad lies in
reorganization, for regardless of what may be the best interest of
its creditors or of its owners, a definite public policy demands that
the operation of the business be continued to avert a failure of
railroad service and that dismantling of the road be avoided. It is
clear that liquidation in bankruptcy cannot satisfy this demand.32
As a result of their exclusion from the Bankruptcy Act, all railroad
reorganizations took place outside the federal bankruptcy system, until such
reorganizations were codified during the New Deal.33 In the early days –
particularly the 1850s and 60s – foreclosure sales were commonly used to
address over-indebted railroads. The railroads of this period tended to be
smaller, single-state operations.34
But as railroads grew in scope, different mortgages typically covered
different assets. The original line would be covered by one mortgage, the
new extension to Boston or Los Angeles funded by a new issue of secured
bonds, and the branch line to Miami by yet another. 35
As one learned commentator summarized:
The chief difference between railroad mortgages and other
mortgages is based upon the fact that other mortgages merely
hypothecate certain specific articles, which remain constant in
kind and quality, while a railroad mortgage is the pledge of a
venture, the assignment of “a going concern”—a changing and
growing security.36
A single foreclosure would not keep the railroad together as a going
concern, and the use of equity receiverships eventually took the place of
earlier foreclosure techniques.37
32. 1 JOHN GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS § 10 (3rd ed. 1936).
33. Corporations in general initially were excluded from filing voluntary petitions under
the 1898 Act, and “[b]y 1910, when amendments finally broadened the scope of bankruptcy,
the pattern of equity reorganization had already been definitely fixed.” 8 SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL
AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 62 (1940).
34. See e.g., Campbell, The Reorganization of the American Railroad System, 1893–
1900 at 11 (1928).
35. See D.H. Chamberlain, New-Fashioned Receiverships, 10 HARV. L. REV. 139, 140
(1896) (explaining that railroads were typically covered by mortgage bonds and the holders
of those mortgages were “numerous and widely scattered”).
36. Henry H. Ingersoll, Rights and Remedies of General Creditors of Mortgaged
Railways, 19 YALE L.J. 622, 624 (1910) (emphasis in original).
37. Cf. HARRY G. GUTHMANN & HERBERT E. DOUGALL, CORP. FIN. POL’Y 329 (4th ed.
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A. Foreclosure and Execution Sales
In the early Nineteenth Century, it was well settled that, absent
legislative authorization, a corporation could not mortgage its “franchise” or
special rights given by the legislature.38 While the concepts of the charter,
franchise or privileges were sometimes run together, the first two were
distinguishable from the latter:
What is called the franchise of forming a corporation is really but
an exemption from a general rule of the common law prohibiting
the formation of corporations. In former times, this exemption was
granted only in exceptional cases, by a special charter in each
instance. It was, therefore, looked upon as something valuable, as
a gift of a special privilege to the grantees of the charter, and was
called a “franchise.”39
As the New Hampshire Supreme Court said in 1856, a “corporation,
being itself a franchise, consists and is made up of its rights and franchises.”40
Or as the Texas Supreme Court explained shortly thereafter, “the charter is
a grant of franchises by the state.”41
Thus, the power to use the franchise as collateral had to be expressly
given by the state, either in the charter itself or in a separate statute. For
example, in Texas state law provided that
no company shall have the power to make any trust deed or
mortgage on the franchise or property of the company, unless the
1962) (“Because separate properties are separately mortgaged, the status of different bond
issues is often obscure until reorganization takes place. Foreclosure and acquisition of the
mortgaged property seldom occur because the separate units usually cannot be operated to the
greatest advantage except as parts of a unified going concern. The right of foreclosure
therefore serves mainly to give the holders of a specific lien bargaining power in any
reorganization in proportion to the profitableness and importance of the property pledged to
them.”).
38. Pullan v. Cincinnati & Chi. Air-Line R.R. Co., 20 F. Cas. 32, 35 (C.C.D. Ind. 1865)
(No. 11,461); Coe v. Columbus, Piqua & Ind. R.R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 372, 394 (1859).
39. VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 884 (2d ed.
1886). See also R. Mason Lisle, Foreclosure of Railway Mortgages, 20 AM. L. REV. 867, 868
(1886) (“Incorporation is the creation of an artificial person, which can only exist by the grant
of the sovereign power; hence when the latter creates a corporation, it grants a liberty or a
franchise for it to exist.”).
40. Pierce v. Emery, 32 N.H. 484, 507 (1856).
41. State v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 24 Tex. 80, 122 (1859) (“The correct view of the subject is,
that the charter is a grant of franchises by the state, and the rights granted to the company, are
limited by the charter. They have a right to be a corporate body–that is, a franchise; they have
a right to construct a public railroad, and charge for its use (incidental powers are conferred
to accomplish these objects); these constitute a franchise. These franchises are the private
property of the company . . . .”).
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power is expressly given by the by-laws of the company.42
Here the State grants the power but requires a further step: the adoption
of a relevant bylaw.
But once the power to mortgage was established, a natural question
arose: What remedies did the creditors have under such a mortgage? In
particular, as railroads in this era were created by legislative act,43 did the
purchasers of the railroad at a foreclosure sale need to go back to the
legislature to get a new corporate charter, to hold the assets obtained at the
sale?
The courts soon developed a rule that the power to foreclose on the
franchise included the power to operate under a charter, a holding that was
soon confirmed by statutes in several jurisdictions.44 An 1863 New York
treatise summarized the law at that time as follows:
The sale by virtue of a decree granted on a mortgage foreclosure
of the franchises and corporate property vests in the purchaser the
right to use and enjoy both, as the same were used and enjoyed
when the mortgage was given; without any liability for debts or
obligations created subsequent to the mortgage. This is a
legitimate inference from the power to mortgage the franchise and
corporate property. The corporation still subsists notwithstanding
the foreclosure, and its business can be carried on under the
original charter, by the purchasers or their assigns.45
This is also reflected in the statutes enacted in this era. For example,
the Texas act of December 19, 1857, section 5 (article 4912) provided:
The road-bed, track, franchise, and chartered rights and privileges
of any railroad company in this State shall be subject to the
payment of the debts and legal liabilities of said company, and may
be sold in satisfaction of the same . . . the purchaser or purchasers
42. Act of December 1857, sec. 4, reprinted in GEORGE W. PASCHAL, A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF TEXAS 820 (1870).
43. Joseph A. Ranney, A Fool’s Errand? Legal Legacies of Reconstruction in Two
Southern States, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 39 (2002) (“Texas placed some limits on private
incorporation laws before the Civil War; the 1845 constitution allowed the legislature to create
private corporations only by a two-thirds vote of each chamber.”).
44. SIMEON E. BALDWIN, AMERICAN RAILROAD LAW 464 (1904) (“Power given to a
railroad company to mortgage its railroad implies power to mortgage the franchise to operate
it, for otherwise the property, in case of foreclosure, would fail to serve its proper purposes
and the public interest might be prejudiced.”). See also Rights Acquired by Purchasers of
Public Utilities at A Judicial Sale, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1937) (citing legislation that
“would grant to the purchaser those rights of the old company covered by their terms” and the
ability to “operate the business as a corporation.”).
45. JOHN WILLARD, TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 744 (1863).
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at such sale, and their associates, shall be entitled to have and
exercise all the powers, privileges, and franchises granted to said
company by its charter, or by virtue of the general laws of this
State; and the said purchaser or purchasers and their associates
shall be deemed and taken to be the true owners of said charter
and corporators under the same, and vested with all the powers,
rights, privileges, and benefits thereof, in the same manner and to
the same extent as if they were the original corporators of said
company.46
And under section 9 (article 4916) of the same Texas act, “the directors
or managers of the sold-out company at the time of the sale, by whatever
name they may be known at law, shall be the trustees of the creditors and
stockholders of the sold-out company, and shall have full powers to settle
the affairs of the sold-out company.”47
The net effect of such a foreclosure sale was to create a new company
– operating the very same railroad, yet entirely free from claims and equity
interests associated with the old railroad.48 The old company – now stripped
of its railroad assets – continued as a trust to pay off its remaining creditors
and, if possible, the shareholders.49 As one commentator explained, “the
franchises pass with the mortgaged property as they were meant to, all that
is vital is thus transferred, and there is neither injustice nor incongruity in
holding that the legislature may treat the substance instead of the shadow as
representing the corporate body.”50
And the law was “well settled that stockholders are not entitled to any
share of the capital stock nor to any dividend of the profits until all the debts
of the corporation are paid.”51 That is, the shareholders of the old railroad
had no entitlement in the new railroad, and they also had no entitlements in
46. PASCHAL, supra note 42, at 820 (emphasis added).
47. PASCHAL, supra note 42, at 820–21.
48. Morgan City. v. Thomas, 76 Ill. 120, 147 (1875); Commonwealth v. Cent. Passenger
Ry., 52 Pa. 506, 512 (1866); Vilas v. Milwaukee & Prairie du Chein Ry. Co., 17 Wis. 497,
502–03 (1863). See also Hous. & T.C.R.R. Co. v. Shirley, 54 Tex. 125, 137–38 (1880) (“But
clearly the purchaser of property at a sale under an execution or deed of trust assumes no
personal liability for the debts of the former owner; and if by such a purchase the chartered
rights and corporate existence and privileges of a corporation pass under the control of the
purchaser, it still does not follow that its liabilities also attach to him.”).
49. Witherspoon & Lane v. Tex. Pac. R.R. Co., 48 Tex. 309, 319 (1877).
50. Lisle, supra note 39, at 873. The author goes on to state, “[i]n the absence of
legislation, there might be some awkwardness in giving a precise legal definition to the new
arrangement, but there could be none concerning its substantial rights. There could be no
diminution of the privileges mortgaged without impairing the value of the mortgage as a
security.”
51. R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 409–10 (1868).
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the estate of the old railroad until all creditors were paid in full.52
As one knowledgeable author, writing at the turn of the century, wryly
summarized:
. . . the procedure was simplicity itself. The trustee of the
mortgage went into court, or resorted to the ordinary summary
power of sale, and foreclosed the equity of redemption of the
mortgagor. The stock, to use an expression more forcible and
familiar than elegant, was “wiped out.” That was the end of it.
The unsecured creditor retired to his place of business, charged the
debt to profit and loss account, and endeavored to make up his loss
by over-charging the successor company. The stockholder went
into the market to find some more bargains, hoping by a lucky
stroke to “average.”53
Likewise, in 1880, the Texas Supreme Court explained that the
“plain intent of the [1857] statute is to transfer the roadbed, track,
franchise and chartered rights entire to the purchaser and
associates, upon their adopting the form of organization prescribed
in the charter and complying with its other requirements; and to
remit creditors unsecured by lien to their remedy against such
assets as pass to the trustees of the sold-out company.54
In short, upon sale, a new railroad was created in the buyer, and the
rights of the creditors and shareholders in the old company remained with
the old company.55 The “franchises would not be forfeited to the State, but
transferred to the purchasers; and the State could not revive the old
corporation by a regrant of the franchises, which had become vested in the
52. LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RAILROAD AND OTHER CORPORATE
SECURITIES INCLUDING MUNICIPAL AID §640 (1879).
53. Adrian H. Joline, Railway Reorganizations, 8 AM. LAW. 507, 508 (1900). Joline was
a well-known reorganization lawyer of his day, who also often served as a receiver. E.g.,
United States v. Whitridge, 231 U.S. 144, 146 (1913) (“In the same years (1909 and 1910)
certain other lines of street railway in the city of New York, which may be described as the
Metropolitan system, were in the possession of the respondents Joline and Robinson as
receivers . . . .”).
54. Houston & T.C.R.R. Co. v. Shirley, 54 Tex. 125, 139 (1880).
55. Id. at 139 (“Under this statute it is believed that a number of railroads in this state
have been sold out and purchased by individuals, who have proceeded to organize and manage
the corporation under the original charter. Not only the road-bed and other mortgaged
property, but the franchise to operate a road and the very corporate existence of the sold-out
railroad passes to the new organization by virtue of the statute. Ordinarily such purchaser and
associates need no further legislation.” (citation omitted)); see also Thayer v. Wathem, 17
Tex. Civ. App. 382, 392, 44 S.W. 906, 910 (1897) (“The effect of these decisions, as we
understand them, is that when a railway and franchises are sold the corporation is not
dissolved thereby, but ‘the corporation continues, and the purchasers become in effect new
stockholders.’”).
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purchasers.”56 Thus, one commentator concluded that
both upon principle and by the decisions of the courts of the
country, that under a legislative authority to mortgage “all the
rights, privileges and franchises” of a railroad company with an
unalterable charter, the company executing such a mortgage will,
at a foreclosure sale, pass to the purchasers the corporate
existence.57
Frequently this was done as part of an overall plan of reorganization.
As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in 1883,
it rarely happens in the United States that foreclosures of railway
mortgages are anything else than the machinery by which
arrangements between the creditors and other parties in interest are
carried into effect, and a reorganization of the affairs of the
corporation under a new name brought about. It is in entire
harmony with the spirit of bankrupt laws, the binding force of
which, upon those who are subject to the jurisdiction, is recognized
by all civilized nations.58
Thus, a mechanism with a long history, mortgage foreclosure, was
readapted to become a corporate reorganization tool. Mortgage foreclosure
ultimately proved inadequate to reorganization of a large, multi-state
business.59 But in these early cases, we see the foundation of the more
sophisticated practice that developed in the late Nineteenth Century: sale of
the operating railroad to a new corporation that would maintain those
operations.60
56. Pierce v. Emery, 32 N.H. 484, 512–13 (1856).
57. Lisle, supra note 39, at 888.
58. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883).
59. See Hand v. Savannah & Charleston R.R. Co., 12 S.C. 314, 329 (1879) (“It is to be
presumed that the necessary proceedings will be instituted in the court of the State of Georgia
for the adjudication of the rights of parties in the portion of the road lying in that state; and
that by the comity of the respective courts, or by the agreement of parties, a time of sale,
assented to in each jurisdiction, will be eventually fixed upon.”). Accord Midland Valley Ry.
Co. v. Moran Nut & Bolt Mfg. Co., 97 S.W. 679, 680 (Ark. 1906) (“The judgment in this case
was correct in form in fixing a lien on all the property of appellant railroad in the state of
Arkansas, but it was erroneous in allowing that lien to be made up of material furnished and
used in the construction of appellant’s road in the Indian Territory.”). New York had (indeed,
still has) a helpful statute to cover this problem, but many other states did not. LEONARD A.
JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RAILROAD AND OTHER CORPORATE SECURITIES, INCLUDING
MUNICIPAL AID BONDS §659 (1879).
60. See De Forest Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy
Reorganization: New Directions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 553, 557 (1954) (“Corporate
reorganization through an equity receivership developed, not as a substitute for the liquidation
of an insolvent corporation, but rather from the limitations of a simple mortgage
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B. Receiverships
While receiverships in their traditional form have a very long history,61
during the nineteenth century they were transformed into a unique and
flexible tool for reorganizing insolvent railroads.62 The precise point at
which receiverships began to be used as a reorganization device is unclear,63
but by the 1880s receiverships had clearly surpassed foreclosures as the
favored means of addressing financial distress:
The new and changed condition of things which is presented by
the insolvency of such a corporation as a railroad company has
rendered necessary the exercise of large and modified forms of
control over its property by the courts charged with the settlement
of its affairs and the disposition of its assets. Two very different
courses of proceeding are presented for adoption. One is the old
method, usually applied to banking, insurance, and manufacturing
companies, of shutting down and stopping by injunction all
operations and proceedings, taking possession of the property in
the condition it is found at the instant of stoppage, and selling it
for what it will bring at auction. The other is to give the receiver
power to continue the ordinary operations of the corporation, to
run trains of cars, to keep the tracks, bridges, and other property in
repair, so as to save them from destruction, and as soon as the
interest of all parties having any title to or claim upon the corpus
of the estate will allow, to dispose of it to the best advantage for
all, having due regard to the rights of those who have priority of

foreclosure.”).
61. See HENRY G. TARDY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF RECEIVERS §1
(2d ed. 1920) (“It is a power which the Court of Chancery of England frequently exercised
long before the establishment of the United States . . . .”). See also FRED F. LAWRENCE, A
TREATISE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1108 (1929) (“The power
of equity courts to appoint receivers is ancient, it being one of the oldest of chancery remedies.
It was not an incident to the authority of common law tribunals. It was exercised as early as
the time of Edward VI . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
62. Gross v. Missouri & A. Ry. Co., 74 F. Supp. 242, 244 (W.D. Ark. 1947)
(“Instructions were issued to the receivers directing them (1) to request the Interstate
Commerce Commission to refrain for a period of 90 days from rendering a decision on
defendant’s action for a certificate of convenience and necessity to abandon the railroad, (2)
to receive and consider plans for resumption of operation, and (3) to consider any offer to
purchase or lease the whole or any part of said railroad.”).
63. Charles Warren argued that federal courts were reluctant to appoint receivers before
1880. Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 364
(1930). In Vermont, one such receivership reportedly was commenced “prior to 1861” and
remained pending in the early 1880s. M.M. Cohn, Railroad Receiverships – Questions of
Practice Concerning Them, 19 Am. L. Rev. 400, 410 (1885).
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claim.64
Receiverships in the early days were sometimes commenced in
response to suits by unpaid secured bondholders. In later years, they were
most often instituted in response to a suit by an unsecured creditor (a
“creditor’s bill”), coupled with the debtor’s admission that the debt was due
and the railroad was unable to pay.65 This was the “friendly” or consent
receivership that New Dealers would bemoan as “collusive” and the source
of much insider dealing.66
As one commentator noted:
From the standpoint of the corporation involved, such a method of
64. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 134–35 (1881).
65. See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 676–
78, 687–88 (1899) (detailing how a court appointed a receiver following a creditor’s
complaint); Brassey v. N.Y. & N.E.R. Co., 19 F. 663, 669–70 (C.C.D. Conn. 1884)(“I am of
the opinion that when a railroad corporation, with its well-known obligations to the public,
has become entirely insolvent, and unable to pay its secured debts, unable to pay its floating
debt, and unable to pay the sums due its connecting lines, unable to borrow money, and in
peril of the breaking up and destruction of its business, and confesses this inability, although
no default has as yet taken place upon the securities owned by the orator, but a default is
imminent and manifest, a case has arisen where, upon a bill for an injunction against attacks
upon the mortgaged property, and a receivership to protect the property of the corporation
against peril, a temporary receiver may properly and wisely be appointed.”). See James
Byrne, The Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts, in SOME LEGAL
PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 77, 79–81 (1917)
(explaining that unsecured creditors were used to reach all property and assets controlled by
the railroad, and not just the property subject to any specific mortgage).
66. Modern scholars, beginning with Albro Martin, have lavished much attention on the
Wabash case, where Jay Gould somehow convinced a federal court to approve the railroad’s
own petition for a receivership. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cent. Tr. Co., 22 F. 272, 273
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884) (“True, the proceeding is peculiar in this aspect: that the application was
made by the corporation itself, instead of being made by the mortgagee on default of payment
of interest.”); Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional
Change, 34 J. Econ. Hist. 685, 708 (1974); see also Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and
Modern Bankruptcy Theory, infra note 119, n. 106 (“The Wabash receivership is often said
to be the first case to allow the debtor to initiate its own receivership, thereby moving railroad
reorganization closer to modern Chapter 11 practice.”). But the consent receivership was far
more important, because it not only launched the reorganization process, but it provided
federal courts with diversity jurisdiction, since the friendly petitioning creditor was always
from outside the home state of the railroad. Warner Fuller, The Background and Techniques
of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganizations–A Survey, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
377, 378–80 (1940). Accord 8 SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES 24 (1940) (“The procedure failed to crystallize along these lines [i.e., the
Wabash approach]; instead, there was increasing resort to another, and less novel, form of
legal action. This was the general creditor’s bill, out of which the standard procedure was
even then being fashioned in other cases.”).
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securing a receivership is to be commended for several reasons. It
is simple, as almost any large corporation can secure the cooperation of a non-resident creditor with a claim of $3,000 or
more. It is expeditious, for the bill praying for a receiver and the
answer consenting can be filed within a few minutes of each other.
It allows the corporation in financial difficulties to have the
protection of the United States court.67
Normally an unsecured creditor cannot obtain a receiver until the
creditor has received a final judgment on its debt, a receiver being more in
the nature of a remedy than an end in itself. But, if the defendant railroad
were to file an answer admitting the validity of the debt, and its inability to
quickly pay the same, the courts felt comfortable moving quickly to the
remedy stage.68
Early receiverships were first conducted in state courts. Later,
receiverships moved to federal court, as the federal judges had somewhat
broader jurisdiction, and developed clear procedures for recognition of the
receivership in all districts where the railroad might have property.69
Moreover, a nineteenth century federal circuit judge could enter an order
appointing the receiver in all districts within the circuit, something no state
court judge could do.70 Likewise, after 1911 (and the abolition of the old
circuit courts), federal district courts had the power to appoint a single
receiver for all fixed property within the circuit.71
In state courts, or when reorganizing larger businesses in federal court,
ancillary receivers would be appointed in all jurisdictions outside the circuit
67. Thomas A. Thacher, Some Tendencies of Modern Receiverships, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 32,
34 (1916).
68. For a good overview of the procedure, see 3 RALPH EWING CLARK, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS § 855 (3d ed. 1959), at 1339. Eventually this process
of “consent receivers” was adopted by the state courts too. See New England Theatres, Inc.
v. Olympic Theatres, Inc., 287 Mass. 485 (1934) (“The question, whether such an
appointment should be made, rests in sound judicial discretion, to be exercised only with
circumspection and only in cases where otherwise there would be wasting and loss of property
which ought to be made available for payment of the debts of the corporation and which
cannot be conserved in any other way so satisfactorily as by the appointment of a receiver.”).
69. See Warren, supra note 63, at 364–65 (“[I]t became customary for a corporation to
apply in the federal courts itself, or (if it could not sue) through some “friendly” creditor with
requisite diverse citizenship; and frequently races arose between an adverse creditor seeking
a receivership in a state court, and a “friendly” creditor petitioning in a federal court.”).
70. Kingsport Press v. Brief English Sys., 54 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1931) contains a good
description of the process, including the debtor’s communication with its petitioning creditors
and the ultimate appointment of the debtor’s president as receiver.
71. Judicial Code of 1911 § 56, Pub.L. 61–475, 36 Stat. 1087. The circuit courts had lost
their appellate jurisdiction back in the 1890s but were not phased out as trial courts until the
passage of this law, nearly 20 years later.
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or state where the main case was pending.72 In some instances, these would
be the same receivers as in the main proceeding. But in many cases, local
receivers, with local counsel, would be appointed. In the main cases, the
receiver was frequently an officer of the debtor, providing a kind of precursor
to the “debtor in possession” concept.73
In all cases, the goal was to place the railroad’s assets under court
control and out of the reach of individual creditors.74 Foreclosure and other
collection activity was halted while the creditors negotiated a reorganized
capital structure for the railroad.
Creditors, and sometimes even
shareholders, were represented in this process by committees.75
While the committees negotiated, the receivers would often spruce up
the railroad.76 These improvements were funded by “receivers’ certificates,”
essentially a form of priority debt instrument issued by the receiver and paid
off by the receivership estate.77
Once a plan was agreed upon, foreclosure suits resumed. The railroad
was purchased in exchange for the various defaulted bonds under a joint
72. 8 SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES,
PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 30–33
(1940) (“In the case of other than railroad corporations, this necessity created problems of
administration which appreciably retarded the speed of reorganization. In every type of case
it involved the additional preparation of many sets of legal papers, the employment of
ancillary receivers and of counsel for each of them, and, in general, a needless duplication of
much effort and expense.”).
73. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1107.
74. Taylor v. the Philadelphia & Reading R.R. Co., 7 F. 381, 385 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1881)
(“The custody of the property of this railroad devolves upon the receivers appointed by the
court. They are custodians of it for the benefit of the creditors. As the object of the whole
proceeding is the preservation of the property for the benefit of the creditors. . . .”). See also
In re Higgins, 27 F. 443, 444 (C.C.N.D. Tex. 1886) (“In order to hold and preserve the
property and the franchises which make the property valuable it is necessary to operate the
same, and the court has appointed receivers to operate and manage the several lines of railway
forming the Texas & Pacific Railway line, running from New Orleans to El Paso.”).
75. Fuller, supra note 66, at 381 (“Protective committees were self-constituted groups,
formed to represent the various creditor and stock interests of the insolvent carrier. Usually
each creditor or equity class had its separate committee.”).
76. Importantly, it was the shareholders and creditors who reorganized the railroad, the
receiver simply kept it in good operating condition. See James William Moore,
Reorganizations under Chapter X, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF. BANKR. 105, 109 (1961) (“It was
not the duty nor the function of the receiver to formulate a plan. Starting, in theory, as adverse
litigation the receivership continued in theory to be such with the interested parties-creditors
and stockholders-as protectors of their own interests. Self-constituted ‘protective committees’
arose to represent each of the various creditor and stock interests.”).
77. Thacher, supra note 67, at 37–42, 45–49. There was some doubt about whether
priority “new money” financing was appropriate in cases not involving quasi-utilities, like
railroads. 1 JOHN GERDES, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS UNDER SECTION 77B OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT § 15 (3rd ed. 1936).
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committee’s control, and the assets placed in a new corporate shell.78 Often,
the new company would adopt a similar, although subtlety different name.
For example, the Reading Railroad might become the Reading Railway, or
vice versa.79
Shareholders typically retained their interests in the reorganized
railroad only if they paid an assessment, which helped fund the new road’s
operating cash requirements.80 In some cases, the shareholders also received
subordinated debt upon payment of the assessment, which protected them in
the case of a future receivership.81 As one commentator in 1900 wrote:
The right to participate in the benefit of the reorganization comes
to stockholders not by virtue of their right as holders of stock, but
purely from the grace of the prior lien creditors, who have, in the
absence of fraud, the power to give to whom they please an interest
in the purchased property.82
Shareholders (and unsecured creditors) who did not participate in the
reorganization were left with claims against the old corporation, now without
operating assets. At most, they might have a proportionate claim to the upset
price – essentially the liquidation value – paid to the old railroad as part of

78. Sage v. Cent. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 334, 339 (1878) (“The amount required is so large
usually, that it is beyond the reach of ordinary purchasers . . . the first-mortgage bondholders
are the only party that can become the purchasers, and they only, because they need not pay
their bid in cash.”).
79. Hon. Henry Clay Caldwell, Railroad Receiverships in the Federal Courts, 30 AM. L.
REV. 161, 169 (1896).
80. See, e.g., Boyd v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 170 F. 779, 801 (C.C.E.D. Wash. 1909), aff’d,
177 F. 804 (9th Cir. 1910), aff’d 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (discussing such transactions where the
shareholders paid assessment to retain interest in the reorganized railroad). See also Kan.
City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union Tr. Co., 28 F.2d 177, 188 (8th Cir. 1928) (“[Because]
the [common] stockholders, in order to obtain any participation, were compelled to further
invest to the extent of . . . 25 per cent . . . of the par value of the participating stock, we
conclude that there is no doubt as to the fairness of this offer to the unsecured creditor.”).
81. See Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 238 F. 812, 818 (E.D. Mo. 1916)
(“In this case the old stockholders are required to pay in cash 50 per cent. of the par of their
holdings. They will receive for their cash payments new 4 per cent. bonds at par. In order,
these bonds will come just ahead of the preferred stock. They will be inferior to all the other
bonded indebtedness, and their subordinate position in that respect, and their rate of interest,
taken together, make it doubtful that they will soon, if ever, be worth par. This will operate
as an assessment upon the common stock to the amount of the discount. That the stockholders
will be given such bonds for their cash payments is not inequitable to general creditors. They
will pay more than they will get in value; but if they paid nothing, and received no bonds, still
the relation between them and general creditors would not be disturbed. Besides, the raising
of money from some source is imperative, and that raised from the stockholders will be for
the benefit of the enterprise as a whole.”).
82. Joline, supra note 53, at 513.
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the foreclosure process.83
This is how the receivership process operated in general. In a few rare
cases, there was no foreclosure sale, and the receiver simply returned the
assets to the railroad.84 This happened when the parties were able to work
out a fully consensual plan, and thus there was no need to bind dissenters
through a sale to a new legal entity.85 If dissenters were small in number,
sometimes the plan proponents would buy out the dissenters to facilitate such
a consensual plan. Alternatively, the old securities might be left outstanding,
because in all cases, “the reorganizers must determine whether the expense
and practical injustice involved in thus preferring the non-assenting
securities is more than counterbalanced” by the benefits of moving forward
with the plan.86
In modern terms, we would call this latter sort of reorganization a
“workout.”87 The parties became bound to the plan by contract, rather than
by judicial action.88 As with traditional receiverships, shareholders would
agree to pay an assessment to keep their interests in the corporation after the
reorganization.89 And the railroad also got to keep its original charter, which
might be of some value if the legislature had granted special privileges.90
As Paul Cravath explained:
A voluntary readjustment may be preceded by a receivership, or
even by the institution of foreclosure proceedings, for in case the
83. Samuel Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate Reorganization, 32 HARV. L. REV. 489,
494–95 (1919).
84. STUART DAGGETT, RAILROAD REORGANIZATION 28–29 (1908) (discussing the
reorganization of the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, an example of a consensual reorganization,
and noting “[i]t will be remembered that, while provision had early been made for foreclosure,
it had been hoped to avoid such a drastic step. Hopes in this respect were fulfilled, and while
a number of branch lines were sold, the main stem escaped.”).
85. See Paul D. Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and
stockholders’ Protective Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary
Recapitalization of Corporations, Lecture Before the Bar Association of the City of New
York (March 1, 1916), in SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION
AND REGULATION 153, 211–12 (1917) (explaining that such consensual restructurings were
more common in commercial corporations, than railroads).
86. Cravath, supra note 85, at 212–13.
87. STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, CORPORATE FINANCE ch. 26 (3d ed. 2021) (“At a basic level a
workout is simply an agreement between the debtor-firm and its creditors.”).
88. Joline, supra note 53, at 508.
89. DAGGETT, supra note 84, at 30 (“The common stockholders, instead of being wiped
out, have received their common stock in the new company upon paying an assessment, the
net amount of which (because of the value of the securities received for such assessment)
would not exceed $5 or $6.”).
90. DAGGETT, supra note 84, at 30 (noting such a consideration in the 1899 Baltimore &
Ohio reorganization).
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necessary support of security holders eventually is forthcoming,
the receivership can be dismissed, or the foreclosure suit
abandoned. . . .91
The same result was accomplished in the reorganization of the Texas
and Pacific Company in 1887, where the foreclosure sale actually took place
but was never confirmed. The consent of the security holders finally made
it possible to cancel the old mortgages, dismiss the foreclosure proceedings,
create new mortgages, and issue additional stock, thereby preserving the
corporation’s Federal charter.92
The railroad kept its name and was indeed the same corporation. The
effects of the reorganization are thus solely the result of the agreement
between the creditors and the shareholders, and the subsequent vote by the
shareholders to implement the revised reorganization plan.93
The
receivership in these consensual cases gave the parties sufficient time to
come to a deal.
In either the traditional or consensual versions of receiverships, the goal
was to implement a deal agreed to by most creditors. The precise contours
of that deal were largely left to the parties, as “receivership courts exercised
very little supervision over this process. They did not typically concern
themselves with either the fairness or the feasibility of the reorganization
plan.”94
At the turn of the century, the use of receiverships as a flexible
reorganization tool was widespread. When the Supreme Court blessed the
use of consent receiverships in 1908 and rejected the argument that their
highly choreographed nature was “collusively made,” the receivership’s
future as the reorganization tool of choice for larger corporations seemed
quite stable.95
But there were already signs of discord.96 As early as 1881, Justice
Samuel F. Miller, in dissent, expressed strong cynicism toward the
receivership process which was then just hitting its stride.97 In a lengthy
91. FRANCIS LYNDE STETSON ET AL., SOME LEGAL PHRASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING,
REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 210 (1917).
92. Cravath, supra note 85, at 210–11.
93. See Texas and Pacific, 46 COM. AND FIN. CHRON., 320–21 (1888) (noting that a
special shareholders meeting had been held the prior week to approve the new mortgages
granted under the plan).
94. Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, 16 UCLA L.
REV. 773, 804 (1969).
95. In re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 110 (1908). See also Hollins
v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 386–87 (1893).
96. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 178–79 (2001).
97. Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 137–38 (1881) (Miller, J., dissenting).
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1895 speech, then Circuit Judge William Howard Taft argued that it would
be better if receiverships were replaced by federal bankruptcy legislation.98
Additionally, a 1905 critic suggested that receivers were routinely flouting
the law that governed solvent businesses.99
In 1908, one editorialist proclaimed that “[t]he undue prolongation of
the receivership in order that the receiver may fatten upon rich fees is a
scandalous abuse of trust.”100 A few years later, the governor of Kansas was
less restrained, complaining that, “the attorneys and receivers who
participate in this graft seem to have no sense of decency, no feeling of shame
when it comes to appropriating money to their own use, which they are
presumed to hold as a sacred trust.”101
In a 1916 speech before the Commercial Law League, Samuel
Untermyer102 argued that many receivership cases were commenced by
corporate officers without the knowledge of their boards, with rampant
insider trading on the eve of filing.103 Professional fees, he complained, were
“easily ten times as large as in any other country and necessarily so because
of the complications of the procedure.”104 He ultimately concluded that the
entire process should be reformed, with railroad reorganizations under the
control of the Interstate Commerce Commission, using a process like that
used for insolvent banks.105
98. William H. Taft, Recent Criticism of the Federal Judiciary, 18 ANNU. REP. A.B.A.
237, 264 (1895).
99. W. A. Coutts, The Act of Congress Permitting Suits against Federal Receivers Injunctions from State Courts, 39 AM. L. REV. 59, 75 (1905).
100. Receivers, 13 VA. L. REG. 995, 995–96 (1908) (“At the present time in this state there
is one large railroad corporation in the hands of receivers, and it is not amiss to impress upon
these officers of the court a lively sense of their duty.”).
101. Arthur Kapper [Capper], Law Enforcement, 5 WOMEN LAW. J. 41, 41 (1916).
102. For background, see Untermyer Dead In His 82d Year, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1940,
at p. 1.
103. Samuel Untermyer, The Lawyer-Citizen-His Enlarging Responsibilities, Address
before the Commercial Law League (July 27, 1916), in CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 26, 1916,
at 98–99; and in 21 BULL. OF THE COM. L. LEAGUE OF AM., 591–93 (1916).
104. Id.
105. Beginning in 1920, the Interstate Commerce Commission was given a role in
receiverships, approving the capital structures of the reorganized railroads. Transportation
Act of 1920, 41 Stat. § 439 (1920). As Professors Armour and Cheffins explain:
This legislation expanded the I.C.C.’s jurisdiction over railways to include the
power to veto acquisitions that failed to conform to national transportation policy.
Correspondingly, an acquirer who successfully bought up the desired percentage
of stock could still lose out due to an I.C.C. veto. This likely was a serious
deterrent to attempts to gain control by the unsolicited open market buying of
shares.
I.C.C. intervention was by no means merely a theoretical possibility. There
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Initially these commentators had limited effect. Indeed, “friendly”
consent receiverships were quite common throughout the first three decades
of the Twentieth Century.106
But slowly, the Supreme Court chipped away at the flexibility of the
receivership process, imposing newly discovered rules to defeat previously
unnoticed abuses, and consequently slowly decreasing the utility of the
process. As early as 1894, the Supreme Court criticized courts who
attempted to create something like a bar date and full discharge in consensual
– that is, non-foreclosure – reorganizations.107
In 1928, the Court attempted to narrow the use of consent receivers,
with limited success.108 Nonetheless, commentators began to worry:
There can be no doubt that the Supreme Court intended to call a
halt to the unlimited use of the friendly receivership; but with
occasional exceptions the district judges have continued as before.
The continued failure of the district judges to exercise their
unquestioned discretion to limit the friendly receivership to proper
situations and to eliminate prevalent abuses is indeed unfortunate
for it may well lead to a reversal by the Supreme Court of its
decision in Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership.109
Henry Friendly would write that while “earlier reorganizers had
regarded the Boyd case as ‘a veritable demon incarnate’, reorganizers of the
1920’s had far greater justification for considering the dictum in Harkin v.
Brundage in a similar light.”110
were at least two instances during the 1920s where the Commission exercised its
veto power to block railroad acquisitions after voting control was successfully
obtained on the open market.
John Armour & Brian Cheffins, The Origins of the Market for Corporate Control, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1835, 1847 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
106. Nathan L. Jacobs, Problems in Federal Receivership Jurisdiction, 1 MERCER
BEASLEY L. REV. 29, 44–45 (1932) (“Although the decision in the Metropolitan Railway case
met with adverse criticism, the lower federal courts displayed no hesitancy in adopting it to
its outermost implications; and abuses of its authority, which will be dealt with later, became
prevalent.”).
107. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 151 U.S. 81, 103 (1894) (“Certainly the
preservation of general equity jurisdiction over suits instituted against receivers without leave
does not, in promotion of the ends of justice, make it competent for the appointing court to
determine the rights of persons who are not before it, or subject to its jurisdiction; and the
right to sue without resorting to the appointing court, which involves the right to obtain
judgment, cannot be assumed to have been rendered practically valueless by this further
provision in the same section of the statute which granted it.”).
108. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 52–53 (1928).
109. Jacobs, supra note 106, at 46.
110. Henry J. Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48 HARV.
L. REV. 39, 43 (1934) (quoting Paul Cravath with respect to Boyd).
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A line of cases followed, all suggesting that the consent receivership
was living on borrowed time.111
Boyd itself can be seen as part of the slow drip of caselaw that
undermined receiverships, even if today it is known mostly for its purported
role in establishing the absolute priority rule.112 While Justice Douglas
managed to twist the understanding of the case for all time,113 its actual
holding was understood in the receivership era to be something like “nonparticipating creditors will not be ‘discharged’ in a reorganization plan that
saves old shareholders.”114 That is only indirectly concerned with priority,
111. See e.g., Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U. S. 348, 355 (1932) (“The conveyance to the
corporation being voidable because fraudulent in law, the receivership must share its fate.”);
First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 515 (1934) (explaining that the
Supreme Court had only approved receivers in aid of reorganization when dealing with
railroads or public utilities where the public interest requires their continued operation).
112. Lawrence M. Bell, Valuation and the Probability of Bankruptcy in Chapter X, 52
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1978); see also Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority
Rule, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 581, 591 (2016) (“The question, [Douglas] said, was
whether the debtor’s plan was fair. He concluded it was not because the bondholders ‘will be
required under the plan to surrender to the stockholders 23 per cent of the value of the
enterprise.’”).
113. In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116 (1939), Justice
Douglas tied Boyd to the so-called “absolute priority rule,” as discussed in the text.
Interestingly, just a few years earlier, the SEC, of which Douglas was then a member,
suggested that payment according the strict liquidation priority (i.e., the absolute priority rule)
was not practical in reorganization cases:
“In the give and take of negotiation nice legal priorities of various classes of claims will not
be strictly observed. Rather the positions of these various claimants will be traded out in
conference, so that only a gross approximation of their strictly legal status will be reached.”
1 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK,
ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES
3 (1937).
114. De Forest Billyou, Railroad Reorganization Since Enactment of Section 77, 96 U.
PA. L. REV. 793, 809 (1948) (“Long prior to the federal reorganization statutes it was held that
a reorganization that did not allow junior creditors to participate in the reorganized company
was unfair and inequitable to these creditors if old stockholders were allowed to participate
to an extent greater than justified by a new contribution to the reorganized company. It was
held also that such a plan, even though consummated, did not preclude these creditors from
asserting a debt claim against the reorganized company.”); Fuller, supra note 66, at 383 (“The
rationale of the decision was that bondholders, who might have purchased the property for
themselves alone, could not permit stockholders to obtain an interest in the new company
pursuant to an arrangement made before the sale, without also giving every creditor of the old
the privilege of participating in the reorganization on a fair and equitable basis.”); see also
HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE’S MANUAL OF CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTICE - A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS ON
ORGANIZATION CORPORATE FORMS 767 (1930) (“In Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd the
principle was established that stockholders may not combine with bondholders in a friendly
foreclosure sale to freeze out general creditors and obtain an interest in the new corporation
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but the holding did inject another aspect of doubt into the receivership
process. 115
Thus, the receivership’s usefulness was well undermined by the Court
by the early 1930s.116 That, of course, was precisely when the need for
corporate reorganization was at its highest.117
And receiverships clearly were not without their faults. The ancillary
receivership process was extremely cumbersome for industrial companies,
who, unlike railroads, did not tend to have their property in contiguous
jurisdictions.118 Professional fees remained quite high, especially when
viewed from a modern (chapter 11) perspective.119 In a speech just before
the market crash, then professor William O. Douglas broadly argued that
“businesses in receiverships are frequently – far too frequently – operated at
a loss, thus depleting the estate which otherwise would be available to
creditors.”120
Looking back, is it now possible to see that flexibility had a kind of
double peak: first in 1908, with the Court’s blessing of consent receiverships,
and then, after a two-decade wobble, again with the enactment of a codified
railroad receivership process in 1933 (“section 77”)121 – and the receiverships
of other, non-rail corporations in 1934 (“section 77B”).122
which is derived in whole or in part from their interest in the old, free and clear of the claims
of its creditors.”); Railroad Reorganization in the Federal Courts: The Unsecured Creditor,
36 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (1923) (“But in 1913 the famous Boyd case decided that if the
stockholders derive any advantage from the reorganization, the unsecured creditors must be
given an opportunity to participate on terms at least as favorable as those offered to the
stockholders, or their claims against the property will not be extinguished by the decree.”).
115. James N. Rosenberg, New Scheme of Reorganization, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526
(1917) (“This important case, followed by another decision along the same lines, has
subjected reorganizations by foreclosure sale to serious danger of subsequent destructive
attack, and indeed is a very nightmare to counsel who have to do with modern
reorganizations.”); Corporations: Participation of Old Stockholders in Reorganized
Corporation After Consent Decree of Foreclosure, 9 CORNELL L. Q. 192 (1924) (“The
difficulty is that there is apparently no way by which non-assenting creditors may be
compelled to accept a fair and equitable reorganization scheme.”); contra Fuller, supra note
66, at 383 (“In the words of one writer, the doctrine of the Boyd case became reasonably
domesticated.”).
116. This was not uniformly viewed as a bad thing. Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 526 (1928).
117. Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171, 191
(1936).
118. Friendly, supra note 110, at 46.
119. Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1452 (2004).
120. Professor Douglas’ Address, 3 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF. BANKR. 48, 49 (1929).
121. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1474 (1933).
122. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 211 (1934).
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It seemed that Congress had killed the receiverships to save them.123
But the preservation of the receivership’s flexibility, now in the form of a
statutory bankruptcy process, was short-lived. And none of these initial
reforms addressed the complaint – dating back to the early years of the
Twentieth Century – that the receivership process was inherently corrupt.124
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these complaints reached fever-pitch with the
Great Depression.125 For example, New York attorney C.C. Daniels wrote
that
The “receivership racket” has taken so much from the stockholders
of corporations that the “graft” of the lower courts looks like
“chicken feed” by comparison.
Receivership allowances,
attorneys’, auditors’ and accountants’ fees aggregate huge sumsto say nothing of the sale of assets under conditions that
“foreordain” both the purchaser and the price.126
This was the atmosphere as corporate reorganization law took a sharp
move away from its flexible early days and toward a fairer approach that was
less beholden to insiders.127
123. STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, THE LAW OF FAILURE 45 (2018). See also Provisions for NonAssenting Classes of Creditors in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 46 YALE L. J. 116 (1936).
124. Supra note 101. As one commentator summarized:
The reorganization of corporations has been the stepping-stone for and graveyard
of professional and judicial reputations and the battleground of conflicting
interests and philosophies for many years. This was due in part to the fact that
until 1934 there was no statute charting the course for the unwary, but use had to
be made of the cumbersome equity or consent receivership. Briefly stated, the
objections to that method of reorganization were to the collusive nature of the
proceedings, the cumbersome ancillary receiverships, the necessity for sale at an
upset price because non-depositors could not be bound, the failure by some courts
to exercise adequate control over the plan causing the Supreme Court to cast
doubt on the validity of these proceedings, and the reputedly large fees for which
courts were criticized, in many instances unjustly because the parties and their
representatives would for tactical reasons present a solid front before the Court
without objection.
Benjamin Wham, Chapter X, Corporate Reorganizations Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
1939 SEC. COM. L. 12, 12 (1939).
125. The SEC’s multi-volume report on the receivership process, largely overseen by
William O. Douglas, was the most prominent example of this literature. David A. Skeel Jr.,
Welcome Back, SEC, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 573, 574 (2010).
126. C. C. Daniels, Receivership Racketeering of Corporation Assets, 3 CORP. PRAC. REV.
9, 10 (1931).
127. See Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, The Case of the Ladies’ Handbags: A Study in
Receivership Procedure, 24 VA. L. REV. 831, 835 (1938) (“Valeria Coriell, claiming that she
had no adequate recovery at law, then sued on this note for the appointment of a receiver with
the usual allegation of multiplicity of suits and dissipation of assets. It is not pretended that
she was more than a convenient non-resident ‘dummy,’ who lent name and diverse citizenship
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THE NEW DEAL AND THE MOVE TOWARD FAIRNESS

Section 77, a product of the late Hoover administration, and section
77B, the general corporate reorganization provision that built off of the
railroad-specific section 77, were never warmly embraced by the New
Dealers.128 And thus, both were revised again before the decade was out.
The broad theme of both revisions was to move away from loose, business
friendly rules, toward a more formal, less discretionary approach, overseen
in each case by independent experts.
A. Railroad Reorganizations – The 1935 Revamp of Section 77
Section 77 was the first reorganization provision to be revised in the
New Deal. While in its original 1933 form it was something of a codified
railroad receivership, Congress revamped the process in 1935 to provide for
a greater role for the ICC. Moving along the lines that Samuel Untermyer
had proposed a couple of decades before, Congress transformed section 77
into a special reorganization proceeding for a regulated industry.129
In many respects, the quick move to alter section 77 was not
unexpected, inasmuch as the “original Section 77 was drafted and rushed
through Congress in the closing days of the Hoover administration.”130 But
by the time the revision was complete, there was such a change in tone –
represented by a strong shift from emergency measures to substantial reform

to a suit planned and negotiated by the bank creditors and the debtor himself.”).
128. See Roger S. Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization, 44 YALE L. J. 923, 924
(1935) (“It is not altogether clear how sweeping has been the reformer’s victory in the recent
changes in reorganization practice.”).
129. Other railroad restructuring provisions, often neglected by modern commentators,
were also available in this era:
In 1939 Congress added Chapter XV, a temporary measure for Railroad
Adjustments to supplement §77, and provide a simpler and less drastic means of
adjusting the temporary financial difficulties of railroads which were not
necessarily insolvent. By its own terms the period within which a petition might
be filed under Chapter XV expired July 31, 1940. But a slightly revised Chapter
XV was passed in 1942 with, however, a terminating date of Nov. 1, 1945 for the
filing of a petition. And in 1948 Congress put railroad adjustments on a more
permanent basis by adding §20b to the Interstate Commerce Act.
James William Moore, Reorganizations Under Chapter X, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF. BANKR.
105, 106 (1961).
130. Charles S. Rhyne, Work of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Railroad
Reorganization Proceedings under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
749, 751 (1937).
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– that the law was almost entirely altered.131
In its original form, section 77 innovated the notion of the “debtor in
possession,” central to today’s chapter 11.132 The goal was to replace the
duplicative receivership process of appointing multiple receivers – often one
insider, plus one “independent” party to satisfy receivership tradition – and
move straight to the plan negotiation.133 In the context of the early 1930s, it
was easy to imagine that the railroad might have failed without any
culpability on the part of management, and thus the need to replace them
with an outsider seemed less urgent.134
The court obtained jurisdiction over the entire railroad, eliminating the
need for ancillary receiverships.135 The debtor proposed a plan and presented
it at a hearing before the ICC.136 If approved by two-thirds of creditors and
the ICC and confirmed by the court, the plan would become binding on all.137
Nascent cram-down provisions allowed for the imposition of plans on
holdout groups.138
After revision in 1935, the debtor-in-possession was gone, and trustees
were required in all cases.139 The ICC obtained strong powers over the
composition of committees, and the right to veto any plan before it went to
the court or creditors for consideration.140 In true New Deal style, the
problem of railroad in financial distress was handed over to the technocrats,
and thus became a question of administrative law.141
The court’s continued involvement in the process was somewhat
awkward, to say the least.142 But the general trend was clear, flexibility had
131. Id. at 752.
132. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77(c), 47 Stat. 1467, 1475–77.
133. Churchill Rodgers & Littleton Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations
under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 571, 574 (1933).
134. See Fuller, supra note 66, at 385 (explaining that section 77 allowed debtors to remain
in possession because of the “theory that financial misfortunes occasioning reorganization
may be due neither to inefficiency nor to culpability of the debtor’s management”).
135. §77(a), 47 Stat. 1467, 1474–75.
136. Id. §77(d), at 1477–78.
137. Id. §77(e), (g), (h), at 1478–80. Interestingly, the court classified creditors. Id.
§77(c)(5), at 1476. Contra 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2018) (modern chapter 11, where the plan
proponent, often the debtor, classifies claims).
138. §77(e), 47 Stat. 1467, 1471.
139. Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(c), 49 Stat. 911, 914.
140. Mortimer M. Caplin, Valuation and Earnings in Railroad Reorganization: A
Consideration of the Proposed Amendment to Section 77, 27 Va. L. Rev. 769, 778–79 (1940).
141. See generally Leslie Craven & Warner Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad
Bankruptcy Law, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1254 (1936) (analyzing the 1935 congressional
amendments made to the 1933 bankruptcy statute, specifically to section 77 on railroad
reorganizations).
142. See In Re New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad Co., 16 F. Supp. 504, 507
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been supplanted by an orderly, fair process, in which all stakeholders would
have a chance to participate.143
B. Section 77B and the Chandler Act
Then came the Chandler Act in 1938, which repealed section 77B in its
entirety, and replaced it with chapter X.144 The changes here were
dramatic.145
For the New Dealers, section 77B was too much like what had come
before. As E. Merrick Dodd Jr. explained:
Section 77B is . . . a series of ad hoc concessions to the views of
the different groups than a carefully worked out compromise
between them. To the reorganizers it gives the main reforms for
which they have asked, coercive power over minorities and
abolition of the sale and of the necessity for ancillary
receiverships. These gifts are, indeed, coupled with concessions
to the individual creditor or investor which reorganizers are likely
to regard as undesirable obstacles to their own control and
inconvenient clogs to the smooth and speedy working of the
reorganization machinery; but the amendment, taken as a whole,
seems more nearly to embody the views of reorganizers than those
of any other group.146
Like its track-bound predecessor, section 77B promoted the use of a
“debtor in possession” model of reorganization, obviating the need to find a
trustee or receiver who was both “pure” and able to ably run the distressed
business.147 Section 77B also contained a provision for what we would today
call a prepackaged reorganization plan: “the plan may be accepted not only
before the hearing as to its fairness, but even before the institution of
(D. Conn. 1936) (holding that “a District Court of the United States in a proper case may in
the exercise of its inherent equity powers approve and enforce a plan of reorganization for a
railroad without resort to the fiction of a judicial sale”).
143. The Passing of the Consent Receivership, 31 VA. L. REV. 184, 185 (1944) (“Today
not only does a standard of the ‘fair and equitable’ in reorganization remain unaltered, but it
is put into effect in the course of the reorganization proceeding itself, where every interest has
a chance to be heard; and by the like token, a plan which is confirmed binds everybody.”).
144. Act of June 22, 1938, ch.575, 52 Stat. 840, 883–905.
145. As one commentator lamented, “[i]t must be conceded that 77B was not given a fair
trial.” Benjamin Wham, Chapter X, Corporate Reorganizations Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, 1939 ABA SEC. COMM. L. 12, 13 (1939).
146. E. Merrick Jr. Dodd, Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 48
HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1135 (1935).
147. Jacob J. Kaplan, Corporate Reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,
6 Law Soc’y J. 879, 881 (1935).
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proceedings under Section 77B.”148 Committees were regulated but still
played a strong role in these proceedings.149
Not only could section 77B plans bind dissenting minorities within a
class, but the section also included full-throated cramdown provisions that
could bind dissenting classes, provided that secured creditors were provided
with “adequate protection.”150 Under section 77B(f), the court was directed
to confirm the plan if satisfied that “it is fair and equitable and does not
discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders, and
is feasible.”
But the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 directed the Securities and
Exchange Commission to conduct a study of corporate reorganizations and
to report thereon to Congress.151 This began a multi-year process that led to
the ultimate repeal of section 77B, and its replacement with chapter X under
the Chandler Act.152
Section 77B’s flexibility was central to is ultimate downfall. Indeed,
the debtor-in-possession and prepack provisions provided the basis for an
argument that the insiders were still in charge of restructuring under section
77B.153 And thus, the SEC produced a report that tarred the section with a
parade of horror stories from the “old days” of the receiverships.154
148. Joseph L. Weiner, Corporate Reorganization: Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 34
COLUM. L. REV. 1173, 1184 (1934). The author notes that the provision was based on the
National Radiator case, where a form of “prepack” was attempted in a receivership, only to
be quashed by the Supreme Court (after the enactment of section 77B), which “used rather
unflattering language concerning the plan and its protagonists.” Id. at 1184–85.
149. Id. at 1185, 1188–89. Some sources indicate that the SEC’s power over certificates
of deposit under the ‘33 Act provided an even greater source of committee regulation. See,
e.g., Carl B. Spaeth & J. Frank Friedberg, Early Developments under Section 77B, 30 ILL. L.
REV. 137, 144–47 (1935) (arguing that the SEC’s view of section 77B(h) was a “more
effective” method of holding committees accountable than 77B’s provisions on deposit
agreements and bondholders’ lists).
150. Reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act–1934–36, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1111, 1185–88 (1936). The Murel Holding Corp. case, which developed the concept of
“indubitable equivalence,” found in today’s Bankruptcy Code, is discussed in the foregoing
pages, mostly as a leading case rejecting cramdown of a secured class.
151. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 211, 48 Stat. 881, 909(1934). The story
behind the report is told in John W. Hopkirk, William O. Douglas–His Work in Policing
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 18 VAND. L. REV. 663, 666–76 (1965).
152. An initial revision of section 77B was drafted by the newly formed National
Bankruptcy Conference. When the SEC’s report came along, the NBC draft was revised to
reflect most of the SEC’s proposed changes. John Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations:
Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1938).
153. Wham, supra note 145, at 13.
154. E. Merrick Dodd Jr., The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Reform Program
for Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225 (1938) (“Both Part I and Part
II of the [SEC] report are essentially briefs – fair-minded and well documented briefs to be
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In the final installment of the report, issued shortly after the Chandler
Act had repealed section 77B, the Commission fired one more broadside at
the old section:
Under Section 77B, the management usually remained dominant
in the situation during and after reorganization, as was the case in
equity reorganizations. It was not held to an account for its
stewardship. At the most, its personnel and activities met only
casual scrutiny. Good, bad, or in- different management continued
in the saddle. . . . And it is equally beyond question that the 77B
method often promoted and induced superficial reorganizations
which left the corporate body with uncured dangerous
diseases. . . . So long as the management is in uncontrovertible
control, it is futile to expect that a genuine accounting for its past
activities can be had, or that its record can be thoroughly analyzed
and appraised.
It is absurd to suppose, if the debtor or one of its officers is
made the appointee of the court to do these things, that they will
be well and thoroughly done. . . .
The important function of formulation and negotiation of a plan
of reorganization was left to the inside few under the system
embodied in Section 77B. . . .
This serious deficiency under Section 77B has been corrected
in Chapter X of the Chandler Act. . . .155
The first step of the new regime was to completely remove management
from control of the debtor.156 Gone was the debtor-in-possession model, and
an independent trustee would now be appointed in every large reorganization
case.157 The trustee was given “most of the power and control formerly
exercised both within and without the proceedings by the debtor, its
underwriters, and its largest creditors, in the hope of causing a larger part of

sure – in support of the Commission’s recommendations for reform.”). Contra Robert T.
Swaine, Democratization of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 256, 258 (1938)
(“It is unfortunate . . . that the SEC Reports lack the objectivity which was to be expected in
the light of the scholarly qualities of those primarily responsible for their preparation.”).
155. 8 SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES: PART VIII 108–11 (1940).
156. Gerdes, supra note 152, at 10.
157. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 156, 158, 52 Stat. 840, 888. Subsection (4) of §
158 declared that a person was not disinterested if, for any reason, it appears they had an
interest materially adverse to any creditors or stockholders. Debtors were allowed to remain
in possession in cases with less than $250,000 in debt. Benjamin Wham, Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, 5 J. MARSHALL L.Q. 180, 183 (1939).
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the fruits of reorganization to accrue to the benefit of investors.”158
Buttressing the trustee’s new role, and an enhanced role for the judge,
was an express role for the SEC. That is, the agency played a key role in
drafting and promoting a new corporate bankruptcy law that placed itself at
the center of American corporate restructuring.159 In particular, the
Commission was required to opine on the reorganization plan in large cases,
and permitted to do so in smaller cases.160 It is interesting to note that the
SEC’s role was advisory, while the ICC’s role in post-amendment section 77
cases was more that of a gatekeeper.161
Nevertheless, it was clear that the SEC had been given a key role in the
process.162 In essence, insiders were replaced with three experts: the judge,
the trustee, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.163 In chapter X,
the debtor plays a minor role, creditors and stockholders are
furnished ample information and are given many safeguards, and
all major steps in the reorganization are subject to supervision and
decisions are to be made by the [district] judge, and not by the
158. Gerdes, supra note 152, at 12.
159. Alfred B. Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YALE L. J. 573, 583 (1939); see also
Jonathan C. Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1609, 1683 (2009)
(“Douglas had a uniquely broad understanding of how reorganizations fit into the larger
financial system of his time. It is thus not surprising that he believed the SEC should be the
administrator of choice for bankruptcy reorganization, and that disclosure rules should mimic
those of the federal securities laws.”).
160. See Chandler Act, ch.X, § 172, 52 Stat. 883, 890–91 (1938), amended by 11 U.S.C.
(1978) (requiring that, when indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000, judges submit plans to the
SEC to be examined and reported on).
161. But under section 173 of chapter X, the Court could not proceed to confirm a plan
until the SEC had either reported or indicated that it did not intend to report, thus giving the
SEC a strong say on the pace of the case. Id. § 173.
162. See Jerome Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.
L. Q. REV. 317, 322–23, 334 (1941) (“We think we can say that the injection of the Securities
and Exchange Commission into the reorganization cases has not substantially delayed the
consummation of these proceedings; that in some cases it has demonstrably accelerated it;
that in others any delay has been insignificant in amount compared to the benefits derived
from the Commission’s participation; and that there is generally no feeling on the part of the
Bar that the Commission’s participation has unnecessarily protracted reorganizations.”). See
also David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 1371 (1998) (“[T]he Chandler act also gave broadranging authority to the SEC to ensure that investors’ interests were adequately represented.”).
163. Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate
Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L. J. 1334 (1939) (“Public
officers and agencies–the judge, the trustee and the Securities and Exchange Commission–
are to dominate the proceedings; management and committees controlled either by
management or by the house of issue find the area within which they may act to press their
interests correspondingly reduced in size and importance.”).
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[bankruptcy court]. Why the elaborate safeguards?
Largely because it was felt that these were needed to cure the
deficiencies of the equity receivership.164
Of course, founding a reorganization provision solely on avoiding the sins
of the past was probably never the recipe for a lasting process.
At the same time, Congress enacted chapter XI, which was aimed at
smaller companies.165 Under this chapter, the debtor had control over both
its own bankruptcy estate and the plan process.166 In theory, secured
creditors and shareholders could not have their rights altered by the plan, but
they could consent to a modification of their treatment.167 From 1952
onward, a chapter XI plan was also not subject to the requirement that it be
“fair and equitable,” a term the Supreme Court had interpreted to encompass
the “absolute priority rule” from liquidations.168
In Los Angeles Lumber, Justice Douglas had written that the “fair
and equitable,” phrase became a term of art used to indicate that a
plan of reorganization fulfilled the necessary standards of fairness.
Thus, throughout the cases in this earlier chapter of reorganization
law, we find the words “equitable and fair,” “fair and equitable,”
“fairly and equitably treated,” “adequate and equitable,” “just, fair,
and equitable” and like phrases used to include the “fixed
principle” of the Boyd case, its antecedents and its successors.
Hence, we conclude, as have other courts, that that doctrine is
firmly imbedded in § 77B.169
Suggesting that “fair and equitable” had acquired “term of art” status in

164. James William Moore, Reorganizations Under Chapter X, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF.
BANKR. 105, 108 (1961).
165. Chapter XI was modeled after the common-law composition of creditors. It was
sponsored by the National Association of Credit Men and other groups of creditors’
representatives who had experience in representing trade creditors in small and medium sized
commercial failures. See Revision of the Bankruptcy Act: Hearing on H.R. 6439 Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 35 (1938) (statement of W. Randolph
Montgomery, Attorney, National Association of Credit Men) (reintroduced as H.R. 8046 and
enacted in 1938).
166. See Peter Van Zandt Cobb, Comment, Initial Financing Restrictions in Chapter XI
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1683 (1978) (describing the initial steps under
chapter XI, where a business may negotiate new plans with creditors while still retaining
possession of its assets, although court approval is required).
167. Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate
Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Yale L. J. 1334, 1353 (1939).
168. Note, Allocation of Corporate Reorganizations Between Chapters X and XI of the
Bankruptcy Act, 69 HARV. L. REV. 352, 355–56 (1955).
169. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118–19 (1939) (footnotes
omitted).
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the railroad receivership community probably exaggerated things more than
a bit.170 Nonetheless, Los Angeles Lumber indicated that the Supreme Court
agreed with the SEC’s inclination to read the term “fair and equitable” to
include something like the absolute priority concept.171 In emphasizing the
“fixed principles,” the Court underlined the degree to which fairness came
from strict application of the “rules.”
But under chapter XI, shareholders could retain their stakes, even when
creditors were not paid in full.172
While “although it seems clear that the simplified procedures of
Chapter XI were designed for small, privately owned debtors,” the chapter
was used by many public companies that managed to shoehorn themselves
in.173 Eventually, this convoluted system of three business reorganization
provisions (one for railroads and two for other corporations), operating in
conjunction with the traditional liquidation bankruptcy provisions, would
need to be rehabilitated.174 And with the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code, it was.
But for about forty years, fairness triumphed over the extreme
flexibility of the receivership era. That the fairness era lasted as long as it
did was undoubtedly largely due to the healthy state of the American
economy in the decades immediately after the Second World War.175 In a
170. In the words of Jack Ayer: “Strictly speaking, this is poppycock, and Justice Douglas
knew it.” John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963,
975 (1989); see also De Forest Billyou, Comment, “New Directions” A Further Comment,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1380–81 (1954) (discussing a paper by Professor Walter Blum, which
explains how the term “fair and equitable” had not yet acquired a solidified meaning).
171. See Eugene V. Rostow & Lloyd N. Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate
Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1346 n.55
(1939) (“The S.E.C. is committed to a ‘strict priority’ view of reorganization
draftsmanship.”). As noted, the SEC apparently did not always hold that view. See SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 114 (describing how the SEC had previously suggested that the
absolute priority rule was impractical).
172. Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, Affecting Rights to Equity Interests under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act - An Essay Dedicated to Wilber G. Katz, 1972 Wis. L. Rev.
978, 982–83 (1972).
173. Discretion Properly Exercised in Relying on Business Prospects to Allow Chapter XI
Arrangement of Large Public Corporate Debtor, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 157 (1964). See
also Melvin Robert Katskee, The Calculus of Corporate Reorganization Chapter X v. XI and
the Role of the SEC Assessed, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 171 (1971) (discussing cases which
involved deciding between use of chapter X or XI for various companies).
174. Cf. In re Herold Radio & Elecs. Corp., 191 F. Supp. 780, 786–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(discussing an array of questions that arise from a lack of case law clarity regarding Chapters
X and XI, none of which are “decisive” on their own, leading to the need for “a rigid formula”
to be applied instead).
175. See ROBERT SKIDELSY, MONEY AND GOVERNMENT: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF
ECONOMICS 154–62 (2018) (discussing the post-war to 1970 boom in developed economies).
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less vibrant economy, the need for a workable corporate insolvency system
would have been more apparent, much sooner.
3.

1978 AND THE RETURN OF FLEXIBILITY

Although chapter X was largely considered to have died of its own
complexity, with chapter XI used whenever possible, it is remarkable how
many leading commentators continued to praise the basic concept of chapter
X, even as an effort to reform the Bankruptcy Act began to take shape.176 In
the early Sixties, James William Moore remarked that chapter X, while not
perfect, was still much better than the old equity receivership system.177 And
Benjamin Weintraub and Harris Levin thought that the revision of the
Bankruptcy Rules in the early 1970s had taken care of most of the
problems.178 That the Rules constituted almost a complete rewriting of
chapter X might give us some pause about the true state of chapter X.179
And there were other hints that all was not quite right. A 1961 speech
by the SEC’s Chicago restructuring chief defended chapter X by reference
to the recently completed reorganization of Inland Gas Corporation, which
took more than thirty years.180 In the same remarks, he also lamented that
176. As explained by one attorney,
I think that the predilection for Chapter XI is based upon the experience of the
creditor community which has come to the recognition that Chapter X is
cumbersome, bureaucratic, time consuming and expensive. On the other hand,
creditors recognize that Chapter XI affords a quicker, more intelligent and less
expensive way to solve an economic problem.
Peter F. Coogan, George W. Bermant & Herman L. Glatt, Panel Discussion: The Problems
of the Sinking Ship, 31 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1378 (1976).
177. James William Moore, Reorganizations Under Chapter X, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF.
BANKR. 105, 112 (1961).
178. Benjamin Weintraub & Harris Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) as Proposed by
the Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory and Reality, 47 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 323, 323–24 (1973). 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2075
(2018)) provided that:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms
of process, writs, pleading, and motions, and the practice and procedure under
the Bankruptcy Act . . . provided the rules do not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right. . . . All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
179. See William H. Lake, The Chapter X Bankruptcy Rules: Procedural Reform for the
Reorganization of a Corporation, 51 L.A. B.J. 493, 493 (1976) (“The Act is largely replaced
by the Rules since many of the provisions of Chapter X are procedural in nature.”).
180. See J. Kirk Windle, Obstacles to Successful Reorganization, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF.
BANKR. 12, 12–13 (1962) (describing how a lack of early approval of a compromise allowed
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“creditors and stockholders who have large sums of money at stake display
almost complete lack of interest in the reorganization proceedings,”181 and
implored the attorneys in the audience to become “reorganization minded.182
In 1972, two leading restructuring attorneys, while generally
sympathetic to chapter X, conceded that
Most complaints about corporate reorganization center around
time and money. It takes too long and it costs too much.
It is true that the elapsed time between the filing of the petition
and the closing of the case is measured in years rather than months.
This results from three basic causes. First, the Chapter is
structured with many safeguards designed to protect the public, the
investors and the creditors. The court, the stockholders, and the
creditors must be informed before they can act or vote
intelligently. They are informed by the Section 167 Report which
is disseminated only after the most careful investigation by the
trustee, aided by the Securities and Exchange Commission. This
takes time. The plan takes time to prepare. Creditors must be
classified, and hearings on this facet alone may require many
months. Valuation is, perhaps, the court’s most critical function,
and this valuation is time-consuming. After all, the debtor may
have taken several years or even several decades to arrive at the
trouble it is in. It can hardly be expected that the accumulated
problems resulting from years of inept management or misfortune
can be quickly solved. The second reason for delay is that many
complex and conflicting rights are involved. A not untypical case
may involve priorities as between tax liens, consensual liens,
mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens, overlapping security interests
with consequent marshalling problems, outstanding debentures
which are sub-ordinated to one class of creditors and not to
another, and problems of equitable subordination. This tangled
skein requires time to unravel. Third, plan acceptance is based on
plan approval by a two-thirds majority in amount of the creditors
in each affected class, and there may be many such classes. The
hard bargaining between the various classes and the trustee which
necessarily goes into the formulation of an acceptable plan makes
delay inevitable. But no one suggests that the democratic process
should be abandoned and “cram-down” provisions substituted.183
Inland Gas to payback millions to creditors over the thirty-year time span, ultimately saving
“thousands of public investors”).
181. Id. at 17.
182. Id.
183. William J. Rochelle Jr. & Jack H. Balzersen, Recommendations for Amendments to
Chapter X, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 94–95 (1972).
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By the end of the decade, a return to cramdown was indeed deemed the
apt solution.184
As early as 1940, Florence De Haas Dembitz, then an attorney with the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation’s railroad division (and who had
previously practiced before the ICC), noted that railroad reorganizations
under section 77 were painfully slow, a result she traced to both an
overworked ICC staff and a process that was overly focused on litigation, in
place of negotiation.185 In a similar vein, in 1943, Robert Swaine complained
that section 77 turned business problems into bureaucratic tasks and formal
litigation, and consequently delayed resolution of financial distress.186
Somewhat later, Edwin S. Sunderland echoed these complaints, placing most
of the blame on the ICC and its laborious procedures.187 By the time the Penn
Central sank into a section 77 proceeding in 1970, it was well-recognized
that section 77 was not really a workable solution for failure outside the
context of the Great Depression.188
As summarized by one commentator:
. . . section 77 is inadequate to deal with the present situation. It
neither provides the tools nor creates the circumstances necessary
for the successful reorganization of railroads under today’s
conditions. This is not to criticize those who drafted section 77
and the 1935 amendments . . . However, as things stand today
section 77 is too limited in its scope, too formal in its approach,
and too circumscribed in its procedures to permit the formulation
of a sound plan of reorganization under contemporary
circumstances.189
184. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. I 1976)(current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)
(2018)) (requiring that courts confirm plans that meet specified requirements, do “not
discriminate unfairly,” and that are “fair and equitable,” even if said plans have not been
accepted by all claimants).
185. See generally Florence de Haas Dembitz, Progress and Delay in Railroad
Reorganizations Since 1933, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 407, 411–16 (1940) (discussing
factors that delayed reorganizations, including “Legal Questions” and an “Overburdened
Interstate Commerce Commission”).
186. Robert T. Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1056–58 (1943). See also Joseph C.
Simpson, Comments on the Railroad Reorganization Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of
1973, 30 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1216–17 (1975) (mentioning several reorganizations that took
years to complete and describing the lengthy back and forth process of hearings, planning,
and approvals required for reorganization).
187. Edwin S. S. Sunderland, Suggestions for Improvement in Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act, 14 BUS. LAW. 487, 495, 498–99 (1959).
188. Steven S. Elbaum, Division of Jurisdiction between Section 77 Reorganization
Courts, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 839, 857 (1973).
189. Richard J. Barber, Railroad Reorganization, Section 77, and the Need for Legislative
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Indeed, ultimately Congress adopted a special “one off” bankruptcy
procedure for the Northeastern railroads.190 In doing so, the legislators at
least implicitly indicated their agreement with the critics.191
In a similar vein, the 1973 Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States argued that “the defects in section 77 stem from divided
responsibility and an elaborate procedure which assumes that the time
available in which to effect a cure is infinite.”192 But the proposed solution
was to make section 77 more like chapter X, with the ICC supporting the
court, instead of operating in parallel with it.193
On the general business reorganization side, the Commission proposed
a new reorganization chapter (chapter VII) in which the “flexibility of
present Chapter XI is retained to the extent compatible with the interests of
creditors, but the protective features of present Chapter X are generally made
applicable, with the exception of the ‘absolute priority rule,’ which is
substantially modified.”194 This never enacted chapter would have also
retained many features of the Chandler Act as well, including a presumption
of trustees in larger cases, and government oversight in cases involving
public securities (albeit by a new bankruptcy administrator, instead of the
SEC).195
Even the need for this seemingly modest set of reforms was questioned.
Two leading practitioners argued that:
Amendments beneficial to Chapters X and XI can be effected
within the confines of those chapters without the necessity of
Reform, 21 UCLA L. REV. 553, 554 (1973).
190. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 902–904 (Reg’l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1974)
(“While the Act is titled a reorganization statute, its drafters acknowledged that the
northeastern railroad problem cannot be solved simply by resort to the traditional procedures
available under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act and the Interstate Commerce Act.”). See Stephen
J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity, 12 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53, 57 (2017) (stating that the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
created a special bankruptcy process for Northeastern railroads).
191. See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Not A Bank, Not A SIFI; Still Too Big
to Fail, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 53, 79 (2019) (discussing Lockheed and Chrysler’s
financial distress before the adoption of a modern corporate bankruptcy procedure). One critic
argued that section 77 was no longer fit for modern railroad problems, and suggested that “the
whole question of railroad reorganization be separated from the consideration of reform of
the Bankruptcy Act and spotlighted as a transportation problem that calls for immediate
congressional examination aimed at producing specifically tailored legislation,” as Congress
ultimately did. Barber, supra note 189, at 554.
192. 1 REPORT OF COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF UNITED STATES 29 (1973).
193. Id. at 30.
194. Id. at 237.
195. Walter W. Miller Jr., Bankruptcy Code Cramdown under Chapter 11: New Threat to
Shareholder Interests, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 1059,1072–73 (1982).

170

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

destroying a thirty-five year old system which has responded well
to the needs of the parties whose interests are at stake. Indeed, the
present problems are not such as require total restructuring.196
In short, as late as 1973, outside the specific issue of railroad
insolvency, there was no clear consensus that business bankruptcy was in
need of reform. Indeed, the so-called “Judge’s Bill,” a proposed revision to
the Commission’s bankruptcy reform bill, expressly retained chapters X and
XI.197
But the American economy looked increasingly wobbly in the mid1970s, and the Bankruptcy Act was tested and found wanting. As
summarized by Professor Minsky:
Not only was income declining rapidly and the unemployment rate
exploding, but virtually each day saw another bank, financial
organization, municipality, business corporation, or country admit
to financial difficulties. For example, in October 1974 the multibillion-dollar Franklin National Bank of New York failed (at the
time it was the largest American bank ever to fail), and in early
1975 the billion-dollar Security National Bank of New York was
merged to prevent over failure. During 1974-75 more banks
failed, and more assets were affected than in any period since
World War II. Moreover, the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT)
industry, with some $20 billion in assets, experienced a severe run
that led to many bankruptcies and work-outs.
In addition, 1975 was marked by New York City’s financial
crisis, the failure of W.T. Grant and Company, the need for
Consolidated Edison to sell assets to New York state in order to
meet payments commitments and the walking bankruptcy of Pan
Am.198
And perhaps as a result, between the failure of both the Commission
and Judge’s bills, and the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, there
developed a consensus that the two general reorganization chapters199 should

196. Weintraub & Levin, supra note 178, at 323.
197. J. Ronald Trost & Lawrence P. King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977,
33 BUS. LAW. 489, 493 (1978). The alternate bill was proposed by the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges.
198. HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 15 (1986) (2008 McGrawHill edition). The W.T. Grant bankruptcy was the biggest to that point, save for Penn
Central’s. Pan Am would file an actual bankruptcy in the 1980s, after the enactment of the
new Bankruptcy Code.
199. Three if you counted the rarely used Chapter XII. Michelle M. Harner, Rethinking
Preemption and Constitutional Parameters in Bankruptcy, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 162
(2017).
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be combined into a single chapter.200 The primary argument seemed to be
that creditors and debtors would benefit from being able to “mix and match”
aspects of both chapters X and XI: for example, allowing the debtor to stay
in possession, while also imposing the absolute priority rule.201
From these relatively tenuous beginnings began the process which
returned corporate bankruptcy, and corporate reorganization in particular, to
a state of flexibility. The 1978 Bankruptcy Code not only consolidated
reorganization chapters, but importantly removed the requirement of a
trustee in certain classes of cases, namely those involving large or widely
held debtors.202 That is, the old section 77 and 77B concept of the debtor in
possession – which had been kept alive in chapter XI – was now back in full.
The SEC was taken out of the center of reorganization and, perhaps
most importantly, its role was not taken over by any other expert body.203
Rather, the New Deal faith in administrative expertise seemingly died, at
least with regard to bankruptcy, with the 1978 Code.204
In a nutshell:
A general and basic concept of the new chapter 11 is the
recognition that the parties involved should be able to negotiate a
plan even to the point that those holding senior interests allow
junior interests to realize some distribution and, if such a plan is
acceptable based on informed consent, the court should not be
hamstrung by an inflexible standard in determining whether the
plan should be confirmed.205
Not all were in favor of the change,206 but the door to a more flexible
200. Indeed, the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and the National Bankruptcy
Conference identified this as one of a handful of points of agreement. Trost & King, supra
note 197, at 494.
201. Id. at 529–30.
202. For an overview, see J. Ronald Trost, Business Reorganizations under Chapter 11 of
the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 BUS. LAW. 1309 (1979).
203. Sarah Paterson, Market Organisations and Institutions in America and England:
Valuation in Corporate Bankruptcy, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 801, 815 (2018).
204. See John Wm. Butler, Jr., Chris L. Dickerson, & Stephen S. Neuman, Preserving
State Corporate Governance Law in Chapter 11: Maximizing Value Through Traditional
Fiduciaries, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 337, 340–42 (2010) (stating that various problems
existing prior to the 1789 bankruptcy system, compelled Congress to create a single
reorganization chapter, Chapter 11); see also Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary
Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83, 84–85 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee as a remedy for creditors who have serious grievances
about a debtor’s estate management).
205. Lawrence P. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J.
107, 108 (1979).
206. Arthur L. Moller, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Happened
to Good Old Chapter XI, 11 ST. MARY’S L.J. 437, 438 (1979) (“One of the most drastic, and

172

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 23:1

approach to business bankruptcy was open once again.
4.

MODERN BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: TOO MUCH FLEX?

In the forty years since the enactment of the current Code, chapter 11
moved from a debtor-dominated system,207 to one dominated by senior
lenders,208 to eventually settle, most recently, on a system where key parties,
both debtors and creditors, frequently adopt a deal well before initiating the
bankruptcy process through a “restructuring support agreement.”209 In doing
so, reorganizations are now structured with but a slight essence of the
Bankruptcy Code, and the framework it sets forth.210 But there are signs that
this new, ultra-flexible approach – where any deal agreed to by large
majorities of creditors seems likely to be approved – may have gone too
far.211
After an initial decade marked by strong debtor control combined with
seemingly endless extensions of the debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan,
senior creditors eventually learned how to play the chapter 11 game too.212
Using the strong powers given to secured creditors under the Code,
combined with the ability to force asset sales under section 363 in place of
chapter 7 liquidations in situations where reorganizations were making little
progress, lenders increasingly compelled asset sales before plan formation.213
probably the least successful, provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code is the consolidation of
Chapters VIII, X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act into a single chapter, chapter 11 of the
Code.”).
207. Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate
Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 485 (2011); see also Lawrence Ponoroff,
Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers Aboard the Flight from Creditor Equality,
90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 331–32 (2016) (stating that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was
the most debtor-friendly U.S. bankruptcy law ever enacted).
208. David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in
Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 931–33 (2003).
209. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J.
593, 593 (2017) (discussing how a restricting support agreement can interfere with the flow
of information needed to apply Chapter 11’s substantively).
210. See David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to A Contract
Paradigm, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1809 (2018) (discussing the benefits of restructuring
support agreements).
211. Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization After
Jevic, 93 WASH. L. REV. 631, 639 (2018).
212. See generally Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and
Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009) (arguing that senior lenders exercise
significant and pervasive control over the bankruptcy process).
213. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of
Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 877–78 (2014).
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By the end of the 1990s, such 363 sales were routine, especially in mid-cap
cases.214
But powerful though secured creditors are – with control over cash, and
special rights under the Code215 – the Bankruptcy Code, even in its modern
form, balances power in ways that it makes it hard to act alone.216 As a result,
in recent years, it has become common for chapter 11 cases to coalesce
around a restructuring support agreement, or RSA.217
In the prototypical cases, the RSA will be negotiated at first by the
debtor and one or more funds that hold a sizable portion of the outstanding
debt. Often, the secured senior lenders will be largely or entirely unharmed
by the proposed reorganization, and thus the action happens in the
negotiations between the next tier of debtholders and the debtor’s
management. Once a deal is reached between the initial creditor group and
the debtor, the deal is frequently opened up to other investors, with retail
investors excluded to avoid securities law complications.
Thus, when the chapter 11 case actually commences, the plan outlined
in the RSA will often have tremendous levels of support, far beyond those
required by the Code. The real question, however, is how much of this
support comes from creditors who perceive a lack of real options. That is,
the deal reflected in the RSA might not be all the creditor is entitled to, but
taking the deal still might be better than an expensive and likely futile effort
to disrupt the RSA.218 Creditors at the margin can be swayed with various
fees or bonuses granted to those who support the plan before a set deadline.219
These RSAs, combined with better-known techniques like gifting plans
and structured dismissals, mean that the “fixed principles” once championed

214. For an example which the author was involved in, see Motion for Order [A] [i]
Approving Auction Procedures with Respect to Proposed Sale of Substantially All Assets of
Debtors’ Business Units, [ii] Scheduling Hearing on Approval of Sale, [iii] Approving Form
and Manner of Notice of Sale, [iv] Approving Break-up Fee and [B] [i] Approving Sale of
Substantially All Assets of Debtors Business Units Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims,
Interests, and Encumbrances and [ii] Authorizing Assumption and Assignment of Certain
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, and [C] Granting Related Relief, In re Brazos
Sportswear, Inc., 99–142 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del.) (docket no. 264).
215. Including the right to receive various fees, the right to adequate protection, and the
right to credit bid. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1), 363(k), 506(b) (2018).
216. Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 857
(2005).
217. See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Private Benefits Without Control?
Modern Chapter 11 and the Market for Corporate Control, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 145, 166 (2018) (explaining the use of RSAs “to move key aspects of the restructuring deal
out of the purview of the court.”).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 165–66.
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by the New Dealers,220 which importantly provided a formal structure to
reorganizations, are no longer present, and that corporate bankruptcy has
now reached a point of extreme flexibility. Indeed, chapter 11 as presently
practiced is now at least as flexible as reorganization under the old
receivership regime.221
But there are also signs of a developing backlash. The automotive
bankruptcy cases of 2009 present this most clearly. Putting to one side those
objections that seem to have been targeted specifically against the Obama
Administration, objections to the use of section 363 sales to push deals that
arguably could not be achieved under section 1129 illustrate a general
concern that corporate bankruptcy has become too flexible.222
And we see this theme percolating up in a variety of contexts.
Questions about the ability of secured lenders to drive the bankruptcy
process,223 challenges to the deals that big creditor groups work out among
themselves,224 and even challenges to the lack of shareholder participation in

220. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118–19 (1939) (footnotes
omitted).
221. William W. Bratton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy’s New and Old Frontiers, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 1571, 1582 (2018).
222. See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and
the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1378 (2010)
(expressing concern about the use of § 363 sales in the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies to avoid
the Bankruptcy Code’s detailed plan confirmation rules for reorganizations).
223. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating
Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 706 (2018). See also Michelle M. Harner, The
Value of Soft Variables in Corporate Reorganizations, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 509, 519
(“Secured lenders may favor a quick sale, either to liquidate their positions as quickly as
possible or to obtain control of the future direction of the company.”); Melissa B. Jacoby,
Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1730 (2018) (arguing that lenders
have gradually shaped chapter 11 to reduce public standards and oversight); Edward J. Janger,
The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 608 (listing aspects of bankruptcy
practice that allow secured creditors “to undercut the value maximizing and equality oriented
policies of the code”); Juliet M. Moringiello, When Does Some Federal Interest Require a
Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. ILL.
L. REV. 657, 658–59 (mentioning the American Bankruptcy Institute’s concern that Chapter
11 no longer effectively balances its primary goals because it gives secured creditors
“excessive control over business reorganizations”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of
Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795, 826–27 (2004) (noting the intent of Congress to
create a system that encourages a combination of secured credit, unsecured credit, and equity
financing, as opposed to favoring secured credit alone).
224. Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Janus Faces of Reorganization Law, 44 J. CORP. L. 1, 16
(2018); Sally McDonald Henry, Chapter 11 Zombies, 50 IND. L. REV. 579, 580 (2017); accord
Alessandra Allegretto, Overcoming Creditor Misfortune Creatively: Structured Dismissals in
Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 36 J.L. & COM. 239, 248 (2018) (discussing the use of structured
dismissals which allow parties to broker their own solutions to Chapter 11 bankruptcies).
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modern chapter 11225 all suggest a growing discomfort with the new shape
that corporate bankruptcy has taken.226 While these largely academic
complaints have found little traction in the bankruptcy courts, there are
growing indications that the appellate courts are more sympathetic.
Thus, we see opinions constraining the more extreme versions of
flexibility.227 The Supreme Court’s Jevic opinion is simply the most highprofile version of this trend.228
The door is thus open for a retrenchment toward a “fairer” corporate
bankruptcy system.229 But given that the primary past example of such a
move – the Chandler Act – was somewhat less than successful, in the next
and final section, I consider how the lessons of history, reviewed in this
paper, might better inform the balance between fairness and flexibility. The
move toward more fairness need not inherently mean a fairness-heavy
approach.
5.

THE WAY FORWARD

Modern chapter 11 rejoices in cases that are tidy. Tidiness is often
measured from the debtor or lead lender’s perspective, although quite often
bankruptcy courts also appreciate this perspective as well.
Nothing is tidier than a case that commences with large majorities of
creditors supporting a plan set forth in an RSA. Regrettably, courts have
shown little willingness to consider how those remarkable majorities were
obtained. For example, did creditors feel pressured to sign onto the RSA
because the deal was going to go through in any event, and those who did

225. E.g., Diane Lourdes Dick, The Bearish Bankruptcy, 52 GA. L. REV. 437, 467–69
(2018) (exploring how shareholders struggle in Chapter 11 bankruptcies and advocating for
equity committees to negotiate with the debtor and its senior creditors).
226. Jonathan C. Lipson, Braucher’s Business: Foreseeing Relational Contract
Bankruptcy, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 191 (2016); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Changes in
Chapter 11 Success Levels Since 1980, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 989–92 (2015) (finding a
declining success rate of Chapter 11 bankruptcies since 1980).
227. E.g., In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting “gift” plans).
But see In re Nuverra Environmental Solutions, Inc., 590 B.R.75, 90 (D. Del.2018) (holding
that disparate “gifts” from senior secured creditors to two different classes of unsecured
creditors did not unfairly discriminate against the least-favored class and did not violate the
“absolute priority” rule).
228. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Controlling Creditor Control: Jevic and the end(?) of
LifeCare, 27 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., 563–64 (2018) (“Although Jevic does not forbid
structured dismissals, it does establish guardrails for their use.”).
229. See Michelle M. Harner, Rethinking Preemption and Constitutional Parameters in
Bankruptcy, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 212 (2017) (noting that prominent figures like the
American Bankruptcy Institute have called for the reform of Chapter 11).
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not sign were relegated to a lower return? Were creditors obliged to consider
the RSA under severe time pressure, and then locked into their support by an
agreement that provides for specific performance and application of non-US
law?230
More broadly, the move toward quick 363 sales, complex DIP loan
agreements that grant lenders extensive control, and the increasing
complexity of capital structures (admittedly, not strictly speaking a
bankruptcy issue), have made chapter 11 ever more an “insiders” game.231
First day motions, with their foundation in a host of ancient receivership law
of dubious applicability, are undoubtedly needed to achieve chapter 11’s
basic goal of maintaining a going concern. But first day motions also allow
the debtor (and the DIP lender, who provides the cash) an ability to pick
winners and losers.
That is, chapter 11 is increasingly subject to the same sort of criticism
once leveled at the receiverships: namely, that insiders benefit by extracting
wealth from small claimants. Some of this is by design: the very move from
the rigid chapter X to chapter 11 was inherently about making corporate
reorganization more like other corporate transactions, where the parties
would negotiate and reach a “deal.” The real charge, at heart, is that the fear
of paternalism has gone too far, and courts have become so tolerant that they
let the dealmakers run away with the show.
The easy answer to these excesses is to urge a rededication to the
“rules.” Discretion should be reduced, and in its place, a more formal
structure, applicable to all creditors regardless of size of stake, set forth in its
place. Typically, this involves a strong belief that the rule of liquidation –
the so called “absolute priority rule” – should make a more frequent, and
more vigorous, appearance in modern chapter 11.
One problem with this easy equation of the “rules” with the ill-named
absolute priority rule is that the current Bankruptcy Code only applies the
latter rule in cases of cramdown, when a plan is being imposed on a
dissenting class, and then only in the specific case of unsecured creditors.232
In cases where the plan is “consensual” – that is, approved by the requisite
minority, there still might be a sizable minority that does not truly consent –
the absolute priority rule has no applicability.233 At the point of a 363 sale
230. Couwenberg & Lubben, supra note 217, at 165–67.
231. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 686
(2010).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2018).
233. Namely, under Chapter 11, a class accepts a plan (and thus the absolute priority rule
does not apply), if a simple majority in number, and two-thirds in amount, consent. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1126(c); see also §§ 1129(a)(8), (a)(10). As a consequence, 49% of creditors by number
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or a “structured settlement,” we do not know which type of plan might arise
in the, often hypothetical, future.
Such worries did not detain the Supreme Court in Jevic, which
nonetheless held that a structured settlement must follow absolute priority.234
Many critics of the auto bankruptcy 363 sales also seemed to think the
absolute priority rule should apply to the terms of a 363 sale, conducted well
before any plan was on the table. In short, although many suggest the
absolute priority rule and other more rule-based reforms of current flexible
reorganization practice come from a more formal reading of the Code, the
opposite is actually true. Nonetheless, more rules and more court oversight
of adherence to the rules is often seen as a good thing by a wide range of
critics, all of whom approach modern chapter 11 for a range of viewpoints.
The trick is that it has long been recognized that the absolute priority
rule does not really work, at least in a formal sense, with a system designed
to save operating businesses.235 This, in large part, is because the rule relates
to liquidation, which has little to do with ongoing operations.
In some sense the absolute priority rule has become like the old GlassSteagall Act in banking law: a concept that encompasses all manner of
reform, with little regard for the actual content of the original source law.
More broadly, as the foregoing historical analysis has shown, the
embrace of rigidity in service of greater fairness runs the risk of making the
business bankruptcy unusable. That is, because fairness is often promoted
by more rules, more oversight, and more process, the reorganization system
loses its ability to be useful. Extreme fairness is thus apt to be an unstable
solution, as the flaws in such a system are apt to inspire swift revision.
The obvious solution is balance. What form might that take?
The current full-bodied flexibility is useful but could be better
restrained by some healthy judicial skepticism. Not every trade creditor is
critical,236 not every sale must be approved on the same swift timeline as
General Motors, and not every priority skipping deal is inherently better than
dismissal or chapter 7 liquidation. Somewhat ironically, judicial discretion
needs to be harnessed to preserve the flexibility of the present system.
Mechanisms to facilitate voice are also useful, so long as they do not
and about 1/3rd of creditors measured by amount could be bound to a plan that does not comply
with the so-called absolute priority rule.
234. Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 984, 197 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2017).
235. Sarah Pei Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99
Geo. L.J. 1615, 1622 (2011).
236. Keeping in mind that the caselaw undergirding such payments was never as stable as
sometimes assumed in modern contexts. Adrian H. Joline, Railway Reorganizations, 4 BRIEF
1, 15 (1902). (“No counsel may, with any confidence, advise a client whether or not his
demand comes within the class which the court will recognize as entitled to priority.”).
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become so broad as to foist excessive costs on reorganizations. Nearly every
modern debtor asserts that equity is “out of the money,” and thus opposes
the appointment of an equity committee. Given the proliferation of easy
lending in recent years, it is quite likely that most cases are indeed insolvent.
But some are not, or at least there might be a real question, and bankruptcy
courts should not be too hasty to deny equity committees a role.237
Likewise, several recent cases – Sears and Toys “R” Us, for example –
have involved sizable numbers of non-unionized employees. These people
have essentially no say in reorganization as presently practiced, while the
shape of the reorganization will have an outsized effect on their lives.
Providing a voice in suitable proceedings – namely, those where the number
of employees justifies the cost – would help ensure greater fairness in
modern chapter 11.238
CONCLUSION
Through a comprehensive review of history, this paper has shown that
American corporate reorganization, like other important societal trends,
typically evolves in big, multi-year cycles. Extreme flexibility is met with a
sharp move back toward fairness, only to move once again to flexibility. The
turning points are recognizable, even if they are surprisingly rare and far
apart.
We seem to be at the start of one such turning point: after almost two
decades of increasing flexibility in chapter 11 practice, hints of a budding
backlash abound, and the appellate courts have shown some sympathy with
these critics.
But another extreme move toward fairness, like that we experienced in
the New Deal, would be both misguided and unlikely to last. Instead, I have
suggested the outlines of a more restrained approach, retaining the current
flexibility with more skepticism about whether flexibility is always required.
Moreover, if we crack the door open to further voices in the chapter 11
process, we can be more certain that any flexibility that is deployed is
actually warranted.
237. Cf. Jared A. Ellias, What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market
Data, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 147 (2018) (comparing the success of junior constituencies
between Delaware and other jurisdictions).
238. Such voice can be justified by the cost the bankruptcy process imposes on employees
over the long term. See generally John R. Graham et al., Employee Costs of Corporate
Bankruptcy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25922, 2019), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w25922 [https://perma.cc/824S-RXV6] (finding that an
“employee’s annual earnings fall by 10% the year her firm files for bankruptcy and fall by a
cumulative present value of 67% over seven years.”).

